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P R E F A C E

RARELY in the long history of the Academy of Political Science has the subject for consideration at a formal meeting been so immediately related to problems of public policy as it was at the meeting in New York City on April 7, 1949. Only three days previously the representatives of twelve nations had signed the North Atlantic Pact, a significant event in international relations which gave an unusually dramatic quality to the discussions recorded in the pages of these PROCEEDINGS. Among the participants were the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Norwegian Ambassador to the United States and the United States Ambassador-at-Large, all of whom played an important rôle in shaping the attitude of their respective governments.

The general subject—"The United States and the Atlantic Community"—provided a challenge, if any were needed, to examine the North Atlantic Pact from many different angles. Of chief concern were such issues as the relation of the Pact to the structure and objectives of the United Nations; its probable effect upon the policies of the Western Powers toward Germany; its strength or weakness as an instrument to maintain peace and freedom not only in the Atlantic Community, but throughout the world. On these points there was a frank exchange of views, which should prove valuable as the people of the United States are called upon to register their opinions during the debates over ratification.

The officers of the Academy here record their appreciation of the high public service rendered by those who participated in the three sessions of the Semi-Annual Meeting in this sixty-ninth year of the Academy's history.

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PART I

THE UNITED STATES AND THE GERMAN PROBLEM

INTRODUCTION *

JAMES T. SHOTWELL, *Presiding*

Acting President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

OUR topic, "The United States and the German Problem", has been made almost illegitimate this morning by Walter Lippmann, who suggests that it should not be discussed as an American and German problem, but in the light of the Atlantic Pact. I do not know what will be said this evening at the dinner meeting on the Atlantic Pact, but I assume it will be fully dealt with on that occasion. As we have not had Mr. Lippmann's guidance in the preparation of the agenda, we shall proceed as indicated. I should add, lest I be misunderstood, that I think Mr. Lippmann is thoroughly justified in his observation.

We have four speakers this morning dealing with various aspects of the German problem.

The first paper is by Professor Gordon Craig of Princeton University. I am proud to say that he is also of Columbia, when he deigns occasionally to serve as visiting professor there. He has been long a student of the diplomatic history of Europe, and especially of Germany. I was told when I took this office that the one thing I must mention was that he had been in O.S.S., and I supposed that indicated a revelation of secrets of wartime. But he assures me this morning he would prefer that I spoke of some other things, because his business there was mostly the study, on the map, of the strategic situation of African rivers.

He has been, as you know, in the Special Division of the State Department, which was a more or less wartime device for disguising the fact that there was one division that was working effectively on the problems of the coming peace. That was his field then. He has the competence from long years of study of the European scene. Professor Gordon Craig.

* Opening remarks at the First Session of the Semi-Annual Meeting.

GERMANY BETWEEN THE EAST AND THE WEST

GORDON A. CRAIG

Associate Professor of History, Princeton University

I

IN August 1943, Ulrich von Hassell, former diplomatic representative of the German Reich and then member of the German resistance, wrote in his diary of the hope of an independent Germany after Hitler's fall. He reflected upon the already apparent division between Russia and the Western Powers and wondered whether the Germany of the future might not exploit it. After all, he wrote:

Germany would have to exploit all opportunities. There is only one expedient left—to make either Russia or the Anglo-Americans understand their interest in a sound Germany.... In this game, I prefer the western orientation but—if need be—I would also consider an agreement with Russia.

These words—written almost two years before the collapse of Hitler Germany—have a striking relevance today. Hassell was correct, not only in foreseeing the disharmony which was to separate Germany's wartime antagonists, but also in sensing the problems and the opportunities which that division was to bring to Germany. Today we are confronted with a situation in which Germany is the main field of contention between the Eastern and Western Powers and in which the Germans are being ardently wooed by the very states upon whom they thrust war in 1939 and 1941.

The present tug-of-war over Germany involves great dangers for the Western World. The chiefest of these we all realize—namely, that Russia may win the struggle and dominate all Germany. But even if that does not happen—even if the Western Powers succeed in establishing a viable Western German state—there is the danger that, in doing so, we may forget the original objectives of our German policy, restore to power individuals and groups whose values have nothing in common with our own, and create a state which is a source of embarrassment and danger to the Western bloc.

It is important for Americans to assess the dangers inherent in their present policy in Germany; and one way for them to do so is to turn to history. For Germany once before was a defeated Power—once before she stood between the East and the West—and, on that previous occasion, she was able to exploit her situation in order to escape the controls which military defeat had brought upon her and to involve the world in another war. There are obvious differences between the present situation and that subsequent to Germany's defeat in 1918; but there are enough similarities to justify some consideration of the earlier period.¹

II

I think it may be said that there has never been a time—except perhaps the present—in which “democracy”, so called, was more popular in Germany than the period between the armistice of November 1918 and the acceptance of the peace terms in June 1919. In those troubled days, Germany lay powerless, her armies smashed by the Allied Powers, her country rent by a revolution which threatened to submerge the land in Bolshevism. In these circumstances, the groups which assumed political leadership in Germany chose to associate themselves with the principles of their victorious foe and called for a democratic parliamentary Germany.

The dominant political groups in Germany in 1918 were the Social Democratic party and the Left-wing elements of the old Progressive and Center parties; and their profession of faith in democratic principles was consistent with their record of opposition to Hohenzollern absolutism. This could not be said, however, of all or even the majority of the avowed democrats of 1918. The bulk of the German middle classes accepted Social Democratic leadership not because of democratic conviction but largely because that was the surest way of protecting

¹ It has not been thought necessary to cite the many standard works on German politics consulted in the preparation of this paper. But special mention should be made of two recent articles: George W. F. Hallgarten, “General Hans von Seeckt and Russia, 1920-22”, *Jour. of Modern History*, XXI, 28-34 (March 1949), based on the Seeckt papers in the National Archives; and the brilliant essay by Carl E. Schorske, “The Dilemma in Germany”, *Virginia Quart. Rev.*, XXIV, 29-42 (Winter 1948), which deals with the whole problem of east-west orientation in German policy.

their position against the threat of Bolshevism. And the foreign policy of the Social Democrats—acceptance of the Fourteen Points and orientation toward the West—was supported by many German Nationalists solely for tactical reasons, in the hope that expression of faith in democracy might win a lenient peace for Germany and make it possible for her to regain a measure of independence in international affairs. Indeed, in the period of peace negotiations, some German leaders thought it might even be possible to exploit the Allies' fear of Bolshevism to the advantage of Germany. On the eve of Brockdorff-Rantzau's departure for Versailles, General Groener of the High Command urged him to point out to the Allies that stringent peace terms might plunge Germany into general despair, and that communism would follow; and later, in his memoirs, Groener admitted that by such tactics he had hoped to persuade the Allies to rehabilitate Germany as a military Power for the purpose of a joint crusade against Russia.

Such extravagant hopes came to nothing. Unconvinced by the late conversion of Germany to democratic principles, the Allies at Versailles imposed a peace which was far from lenient and which established controls designed to prevent German rearmament or the resurgence of aggressive nationalism. The outburst of fury which greeted the peace terms in Germany was followed by a perceptible weakening of the popularity of democracy. As long as Bolshevism remained a threat to propertied interests, there was no open manifestation of this. By the end of 1919, however, the Spartakist menace had been liquidated and internal security had been restored, and in the following year these facts and resentment against the peace treaty were reflected in a strong swing to the right in German domestic politics. The elections of June 1920 showed the evanescent character of the wave of democracy which had swept Germany in 1918. The middle classes which had temporarily supported the Weimar Coalition now gave their votes to the chauvinist parties of the Right and the pre-war ruling groups came back to prominence.

This domestic revolution of June 1920 also brought an end to the predominantly western orientation of German foreign policy. The professional diplomats, the soldiers and the industrialists, whose influence in policy formulation was now reestablished, sought to restore Germany's freedom of diplomatic

action as a first step toward restoring Germany's power; and, in furtherance of this intention, they had no compunction about turning away from the West and toward Soviet Russia.

The man whose name is most closely associated with the new eastern orientation was General Hans von Seeckt, head of the German Reichswehr. Seeckt thought primarily in terms of military recovery, and it was his hope that collaboration with Russia might make possible the evasion of the military clauses of the peace treaty. As early as the fall of 1920, Seeckt, on his own initiative, was sending agents to Moscow to establish relations with the Russian General Staff; and, in September 1921, secret talks in Berlin laid the basis for a Russo-German agreement concerning production of war materials on Russian soil. In these meetings detailed plans were drawn up for the establishment of aviation and tank training schools and for the production inside Russia of aircraft, artillery grenades, and poison gas by German firms like Junkers, Stolzenberg and Krupp; and in 1922 German officers were despatched to Russia to set these plans in operation.

Seeckt's schemes were given full support by the politicians. To men like Josef Wirth and Walther Rathenau—who were discovering that the Western Powers were united in their insistence that the Versailles peace terms be observed—the new eastern orientation offered a means of demonstrating that Germany was neither isolated nor completely helpless. It was Rathenau, indeed, who in April 1922 supplemented Seeckt's secret negotiations with the conclusion of the much publicized Treaty of Rapallo, in which Russia and Germany announced to the world that they were henceforth pledged to mutual peace and friendship.

The importance of Rapallo can scarcely be underestimated. It was, as the spokesman of the *Deutsche Volkspartei* announced, "a symptom of the resurrection of Germany's activity" in foreign affairs. It not only surprised the Western Powers but tended to disunite them, making the British at least more receptive to German arguments against the Versailles Treaty. Thus, Ago von Maltzan was to claim later that Rapallo was the necessary prerequisite for the Dawes Plan and the relaxation of military controls on Germany. And finally, of course, Rapallo gave an impetus to the joint Russo-German military plans formulated earlier by Seeckt.

Had Seeckt had his way, Rapallo would have been followed by an actual military alliance between Russia and Germany. To the professional diplomats, however, who thought in terms of playing Russia off against the West and winning advantages from both, such a permanent tie seemed premature. Germany's first ambassador to Russia, Brockdorff-Rantzau, warned in September 1922 that it would be dangerous "for us to give ourselves into the hands of the wholly unscrupulous Soviet Government", that it would destroy the possibility of driving a real wedge between England and France, and that active alliances must be deferred to a later date. Here there is no doubt that the diplomat was wiser than the soldier. Given his head, Seeckt might very well have precipitated a general war in 1923—it is known that he weighed seriously the possibility of joint Russo-German assaults on Poland and Czechoslovakia—and the results of such military adventures would have been disastrous. In a phrase used earlier by Walther Rathenau, Germany by such policy would merely have committed hara-kiri on the doorstep of France.

Instead of committing Germany definitely to the eastern orientation, the Foreign Office maintained a flexibility of policy which made possible adjustment to changing needs. Thus, when the French invasion of the Ruhr involved Germany in the horrors of inflation, the eastern orientation was jettisoned temporarily by the government and—despite the anguished cries of the Russians who warned against dangers of Western imperialism—a new approach was made to the West.

This new western orientation of 1923 was no more bred of love of democracy or affection for the West than the western orientation of 1918. It was a tactical shift made necessary by the collapse of the German currency, the spread of social disorder, and the dangerous resurgence of communism within Germany. It was designed to bolster up German industry by securing loans from the West and it succeeded in that purpose. It succeeded also in winning a degree of sympathy for the German cause in the Western World which had its logical culmination in the Locarno agreement of 1925, the entrance of Germany into the League of Nations, and the relaxation, despite French objections, of the military control system imposed upon Germany in 1918.

The formulator and executor of Germany's foreign policy from 1923 to 1929 was Gustav Stresemann; perhaps the greatest German diplomatist since Bismarck. Stresemann was perfectly sincere in his desire to break down what he called "the iron curtain between France and Germany"; because he felt that a *détente* in Franco-German relations was the indispensable prerequisite for the attainment of Germany's legitimate policy objectives. These objectives he defined as a diminution of the reparations burden, the withdrawal of Allied troops from German soil, the general strengthening of Germany's diplomatic position, and, eventually, the rectification by peaceful means of Germany's frontiers to the east. But if these objectives were to be attained, Stresemann also insisted, Germany must not orient herself so completely to the West that she became a satellite of the Western Powers. In words which might almost be applied to the present situation, Stresemann in 1925 said that Germany must continue to balance between Russia and the Western Powers.

The question of a choice between east and west [he wrote] does not follow from our entrance into the League of Nations. One can make such a choice only if he has military power at his disposal. In our case, unfortunately, that is lacking. We can neither become a continental dagger for England, as some desire, nor can we trust ourselves to a German-Russian alliance. I warn against the utopia of flirting with Russia. Once the Russians are in Berlin, the red flag will fly from the castle; and in Russia they will be satisfied with having bolshevized Europe to the Elbe and will allow the rest of Germany to be gobbled up by the French. On the other hand, we are perfectly ready to deal with the Russians on another basis in order to prevent selling ourselves to the west. . . . The most important [task of German foreign policy] is the liberation of German soil from any occupying force. We must get the stranglehold off our neck. On that account German policy will be one of *finassieren* [of finesse] and of avoiding the great decisions.

When, in 1926, the Russians themselves began to accuse Stresemann of selling Germany out to the West, and when their complaints were taken up by the German Nationalists, Stresemann found it expedient to modify his earlier doubts and to conclude a new agreement with Russia, the so-called Treaty of Berlin, which converted Russo-German friendship into a vir-

tual alliance. The British ambassador in Berlin noted that the new treaty "shows how unwilling the Germans are to separate themselves in any absolute manner from the Russian connection." This was a correct conclusion. The policy of finesse demanded that Germany keep a foot in both the Eastern and Western camps.

Nor can there be any doubt that the policy of finesse worked, to the extent of restoring to Germany complete diplomatic freedom and a large measure of military power. The western connection brought Germany not only loans to stimulate her heavy industry but also — despite French complaints — the progressive relaxation of military controls. In 1927, for instance, the work of the Inter Allied Control Commission came to a complete stop; and thereafter Western military observers in Germany could report violations of the treaty but could scarcely expect anything to be done about them. At the same time, Germany's eastern connection, strengthened by the Treaty of Berlin, enabled Germany to push forward the joint armament and training program laid down by Seeckt in 1921.

If, in these same years, the democratic forces inside Germany had grown in strength, the recovery of Germany which was effected by Stresemann might have contributed to the general pacification of Europe and the restoration of a balance of power not unlike that of the Bismarck period. History, however, was not so kind; and after the collapse of the German economy in 1929-1930 it was Adolph Hitler who emerged as the beneficiary of Stresemann's work. When Hitler assumed power, he found that the controls devised in 1918 to restrain ambitions like his own were already so weak as to be ineffective; his main contribution was to destroy what was left of them publicly and contemptuously. Hitler found also that the incompatibility of English and French views was so great that he need no longer place as much importance on a Russian tie as had his predecessors. But even Hitler, it should be noted, did not abandon the eastern orientation completely. In 1939 when Western opposition to his designs began to harden, Hitler's ambassador in Moscow informed the Russians that Germany still considered the Berlin Treaty of 1926 as a valid instrument; and, thus, Stresemann's treaty served as the basis for the negotiations which led to the Nazi-Soviet Pact.

Seen as a whole, the period 1918-1939 is one in which Germany was able to recover from an isolated and powerless

condition by using a shifting east-west orientation. In the adjustment of her policy from phase to phase, genuine conviction—real agreement with Eastern or Western ideals—played a very minor rôle. The game was one of expediency, designed to promote German interests, to build up German power and to free Germany from dependence upon others.

III

As I said before, there are, of course, great differences between the situation which obtained in Germany after 1918 and the situation in Germany today. Germany is at present in a state of total occupation, which was never true after 1918. Moreover, since—even in the West—there is no autonomous government with power to determine foreign policy, there has been little opportunity for Germans thus far to indulge in diplomatic maneuvering. One suspects, however, that these differences are not essential. The logic of events, by bringing on the current Soviet-Western duel, has made the problem of east-west orientation more vital for Germans than ever before. The Russians have already forcibly "oriented" their zone unto themselves; the Western Powers are frantically engaged in building up a Western German state as a bulwark against the Soviet.

As we go ahead with this objective, can we learn anything from the history of the earlier period? At the very least, it would seem that historical memory should make us more skeptical of German professions of democracy than we seem to be at present. The predominant political tendency in Germany today is orientation toward the West. Because of this, and in our eagerness to check Russia, we appear in recent months to have assumed that western orientation is synonymous with democratic conviction; and we have been irritated because the French have been rather less convinced by this late conversion and rather more reluctant to reward it with a grant of powers of autonomy in government and industry. Yet we have little evidence to justify a belief that the present western orientation is any different from the similar movements of 1918 and 1923—a rally to the West on the part of a middle class motivated by fear of communism and by the desire to assume positions of power in any German state we may set up. Certainly all of the clamant German professions of faith in Western ideals are discounted by recent intelligence to the effect that, through-

out the Western zones, there has been a revival of nationalistic parties, that former Nazis have been creeping back into public office, and that the leadership principle still exercises a fatal attraction among German youth. Even within the last few weeks, there have been sufficient reports of this kind to suggest that there may be more "democrats in name" than "democrats in principle" in Western Germany.

Moreover, it is at least questionable that we ourselves have done much to encourage the genuine democratic elements which do exist in Germany. That there are such forces—in the trade-union movement, for instance, and in the Social Democratic party—is evident. But one suspects at times that our policy makers in Germany have been alienated by the advanced social doctrines advocated by these groups and have preferred to work with men whose political past may be suspect but whose views on free private enterprise are sound. Thus there is a real danger that we may be on the point of setting up an autonomous state in which political and economic power will be controlled by men who pay lip service to democracy but whose allegiance to democratic ideals will be as short lived as it was in 1918-1919 and in 1933. That such a state would be an effective bulwark against the Soviet threat is doubtful.

Indeed, a Western German state which was dominated by rehabilitated industrialists, disguised nationalists, ex-Party *Bonzen* and civil servants carried over from the old régime might well reward its creators by a speedy accommodation with Russia. Here again history provides a warning. If, in the 20's, fear of communism was a prevalent middle-class reaction, willingness to deal with Russia was something which cut across class lines and inspired the activities of Germans of varying social status. So in the future, while middle-class fear of communism may be a factor in our favor it may not be sufficiently strong to weld Germany permanently to the West. The Germans, after all, remember their own history and are aware that, in the 20's, Soviet Russia—as a counterweight to the West—was a potent instrument in German recovery. The temptation to try to make history repeat itself may be too great to resist.

Thus, within our Western German state, we may see the emergence of a new eastern school which comprises—as it did in the 20's—not only professed Communists and Left-wing labor leaders, but also such diverse elements as: soldiers (like

Seeckt) who hope for the rehabilitation of their profession through collaboration with Russia; ex-diplomats (like Ulrich von Hassell) who hope to try their hand at Stresemann's policy of finesse; business men (including some of the very industrialists who are currently recipients of American favors) who remember the profits made by the Junkers and Krupps in the 20's; unsophisticated patriots who dream of becoming twentieth-century Yorck von Wartenburgs and freeing Germany from Western domination with Russian aid; and despairing aristocrats (like Brockdorff-Rantzau in his last years or like Adam von Trott zu Solz of the German resistance) who revolt against the "bourgeois prejudice and pharisaic theorizing" of the West and succumb to the blandishments of national bolshevism. The school indeed may well be already in the process of formation. The *Times* informs us that, in Bavaria, Hesse and North Rhine-Westphalia, many business men and politicians, especially the former, seem to have forgotten their fear of communism and are openly advocating "some sort of rapprochement between Eastern and Western Germany". We are warned further by Mr. Walter Lippmann that Karl Nadolny—a prominent pre-war exponent of Russo-German friendship—is now in Western Germany, negotiating with the politicians who had been regarded as firm advocates of Western Union. This evidence merely reinforces the historical admonition. Unless the Western Powers exercise extreme caution in delineating the powers of their new German state and in selecting its rulers, it is quite likely that they may yet be rudely startled by a new Rapallo.

REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN

CHAIRMAN SHOTWELL: Professor Craig, we are very appreciative indeed. It was a masterly survey—and I say it in all sincerity—of the historical background of this problem.

It is my conviction, and perhaps it is because I am a hardened old historian, that through history we find the only way by which we can proceed to the formation of sound judgments concerning the present. That method will continue with us in the next paper by President Shuster, whose experience in the field of intellectual contacts is unrivaled in our midst. You need no introduction to New Yorkers, President Shuster!

GERMAN REEDUCATION: SUCCESS OR FAILURE

GEORGE N. SHUSTER

President, Hunter College

THE student of sundry efforts to create a "democratic" Germany might well consider these lines from Plato's *Republic*:

Will not the city which you are founding be an Hellenic city?

It ought to be.

Then will not its citizens be good and civilized?

Yes, very civilized.

For a long time this was the assumption upon which the cultural activities sponsored by Military Government rested. Almost immediately after the entry of the United States into the war, discussion of methods for counteracting the virulent Nazi philosophy during the years to follow was inaugurated. The General Advisory Committee to the Division of Cultural Relations in the Department of State, of which our Chairman was a valued member, arranged a conference on the subject, and later on Mr. Grew invited a number of educators to serve as consultants. While the conclusions thus reached were tentative and in some respects inevitably unrealistic, it can be said of them that on the whole they were moderate, constructive and based upon awareness of the German mentality and tradition. No one believed that an invasion of school teachers from Kokomo and outlying areas would automatically induce redemption. Everyone knew that the task ahead was difficult and hard. Liaison with the Army had been established, and one can without hesitation assert that military thinking was of comparable quality. In Britain the problem of German reeducation was likewise given a great deal of earnest attention, and I am sure that the counsel offered to the Foreign Office by Sir Alfred Zimmern was of the same character as that which our State Department received.

By the middle of 1944, however, the climate of opinion at the White House had changed. In the first place, the question

of how to coöperate with the Russians after victory had been achieved became a crucial question, and the lack of evidence on which to base a conclusion was compensated for by a great deal of very wishful thinking. Second, the views on the German problem enunciated in this country by Emil Ludwig and others were, like those sponsored in Great Britain by Sir Robert Vansittart, received with ever increasing favor. Germany was to be put in a kind of press so that the poisons of nazism and nationalism could be slowly and forcibly extracted. Soon our official policy became what is now known as the Morgenthau Plan, and we were committed to the Potsdam Agreement. Therewith any such cultural program as had been envisaged by the Department of State and the British Foreign Office had to be abrogated.

The principal baneful consequence was that one of the most brutal and oppressive forced migrations in history was begun and carried through. About 14,000,000 people were stripped of their possessions and compelled to move westward under conditions which led to the deaths of uncounted numbers through hunger, mistreatment and actual barbarity. Having reached the American and British Zones, the surviving refugees were settled upon a resident population already suffering from a very severe housing shortage. Differences in language, customs and religion subsequently helped to undermine regional mores and morals.

In addition a number of decrees established American cultural policy for the two years which immediately followed the victory. Some of them may be briefly characterized as follows:

First, the non-fraternization order which according to Marshall Knappen "created a sense of superiority on the part of our troops which in time amounted to a veritable master-race complex." While harlotry was not curtailed, even the most distinguished anti-Nazi Germans were often treated as if they had personally been in charge of Buchenwald.

Second, the denazification regulations which, though in part responsible for trials which were honestly and ably conducted, gave rise to so many abuses that the end impression left on the German mind was catastrophically bad. Crimes committed by American personnel representing the United States seem so horrible in retrospect that it is difficult to believe that Americans could have resorted to such bestial practices. Accounts

by victims have been carried into virtually every German household.

Third, the reorganization of mass communications in such a way that in many places and for considerable periods of time the press and the radio were in the control of irresponsible extremists of both the Right and the Left. The paradoxical fashion in which the American right hand succeeded in not knowing what the left hand was doing did not escape the notice of German critics.

Add to these things the baffling eccentricity which attended the process of dismantling German industry and some clumsy and even abysmally ignorant attempts to reform the German schools, and it will easily be discerned why the total situation had deteriorated so far by the end of 1946 that all hope for improvement seemed gone. But with the issuance of the Joint Directive of July 15, 1947, there took place a radical change in economic and cultural policy. For the first time it became possible to think of doing some of the things which had been recommended during the early stages of the war. Unfortunately so much damage had been done that the task was a formidable one, indeed.

The new order of things is naturally difficult to evaluate as yet, but there can be no doubt that at great cost a number of rather important things have been accomplished. First, the Civil Affairs Division and the Educational and Cultural Relations Division of OMGUS have been given a large measure of autonomy. Their leadership is on the whole good and is sometimes—as in the case of Dr. Alonzo G. Grace—truly representative of the best minds this country has to offer. Though we still desire to make the German educational system democratic (as no doubt we should), it is frankly being conceded that there is also room for improvement throughout the rest of the world, including the United States. This attitude makes possible some sincere collaboration, so that the best Germans are developing a feeling that their efforts and suggestions are welcomed. Second, the work done at the Youth Centers established by the Army is in general excellent and one may be sure that we are reclaiming many thousands of boys and girls for useful living. Here are virtual settlement houses in the noblest American tradition. Finally, the program of cultural exchanges, though it may well have its faults, is beginning

to produce valuable results. The Army has been sending a steady stream of journalists, representative women, youth leaders, teachers, labor officials and students to this country for a period of study and observation. Conversely American educators, writers and men of affairs have been going to Germany, not any longer as purveyors of advice but as participants in the cultural life of the country. It is of course not easy to evaluate these endeavors, but I shall venture the opinion that the way has been prepared for substantial progress.

Nevertheless it should be borne in mind always that the administration of Germany is from many points of view as hazardous and even thankless an assignment as could be imagined. A brief glance at some of the more easily recognizable obstacles to success will illustrate. The Anglo-Saxon Powers, committed to a belief in the dignity and freedom of the individual man, have two rivals for German cultural attention. Russian propaganda has so far placed special emphasis on cultural developments. Educational changes ordered in the Soviet Zone have been concerned in the main with removing qualitative norms in favor of an egalitarian and secularistic school system. Cultural activities, on the other hand, have centered on the fact that some of the ablest contemporary German writers and artists were resident in the East and committed, at least for a time, to ultra-leftist views. The westward migration of Plivier, author of *Stalingrad* and most notable of the writers about the war, must therefore have been a severe blow to the Russians. But one must be candid and say that a great deal that is important goes on in the Russian Zone. To a very great extent, a verdict is correct that says that the Russians have been creatively much more imaginative than we in this realm. I think it is doubtful whether, on the whole, cultural activities which take place in Western Germany are as good as those which are sponsored in the Eastern Zone.

American authorities understandably enough countered by trying to be equally egalitarian in school matters, and ran into Bavarian opposition, particularly in so far as the Gymnasium is concerned. Meanwhile it was unfortunately not realized that Germany, under the Weimar Republic and even in a measure under Hitler, had made rather ample provision for scholarships to assist well-qualified needy young people to complete their secondary and university education. It seems

to me that the best and cheapest measure we could have adopted, particularly in the wake of the currency reform, would have been to replenish the coffers whence these funds were derived. Nor, the emphasis having been so largely placed on pedagogical routine, have we been able to see how vitally important it remains to recognize whatever of great artistic, scholarly and intellectual distinction there is to be found in Germany. Even now the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, unquestionably the ablest and most illustrious of liberal German newspapers, has not been resurrected. Instead we have wasted money on intellectualist organs of our own manufacture which, however well intentioned, are of precious little use under the circumstances.

On the other hand, inside the French Zone there has been established a policy of economic exploitation associated with a highly astute and competently managed program of cultural propaganda. A great deal has been done to advertise the unquestioned virtues of the French civilization. The result seems to be that while most Germans probably rather like Americans they do not respect them, whereas they dislike the French intensely while according them a very real measure of intellectual recognition. In short, we have been caught up in an eddy of cultural competition for which we are by nature and tradition unprepared. The American soldier, addicted to spasms of homesickness which end in alcoholic baying at the moon, is not offset by the determined apostle of the best in our democracy, willing to live on the German level, acquire knowledge of the language and the culture, and thus win the right to wield an influence comparable to that of the missionary in heathen lands. We are without a technique of infiltration and without devoted masters of that technique.

The present hour is, in the opinion of qualified German observers, perhaps the most crucial since the end of the war. There has set in a notable revival of German nationalist sentiment, inspired on the one hand by long-continued economic need and on the other hand by smouldering resentment of what is held to be injustice. In addition the German knows well that a battle is being waged for his soul, no longer on the basis of unanimous antipathy to nazism but rather in the light of frankly acknowledged power politics. He would hardly be human if in his dire plight he failed to dream of taking advantage of the situation. It would therefore be a great mistake

to assume that everybody who now professes to be anti-Communist can be relied upon to remain so. True enough, no German in his right mind now wishes to live in the Soviet Zone. But if as a result of some sudden shift in Russian policy it were possible to strike a bargain with the Kremlin comparable to the agreement reached at Rapallo after World War I, it might well be that a mighty tide of German sentiment would applaud.

At this point I should like to say a few words about a very good observation made by Professor Craig. The current revival of ultra-nationalistic groups in the Western Zone is a phenomenon which needs study. There have come into this zone from Russian training centers about 1,500 repatriated soldiers, who not only have been completely indoctrinated in the theory of Marx, Lenin, Stalin, *et al.*, but who have learned all the techniques of organization. Some of the German papers have been talking recently quite frankly and openly about some of them. When one sees ultra-nationalist groups emerging, one can assume that there is in the background one of these young veteran organizers.

Communism will not be revived in Western Germany. It will come back wearing a different label, and with a somewhat different orientation, but, in the final analysis, it will be an instrument of the foreign policy of the Kremlin.

It seems to me, in consequence of what has been said, that, while our policy must henceforth cling resolutely to the lines set down in the Directive of July 1947, it ought to be shaped in full awareness of the fact that the decisive struggle in the cold war has by no means been fought. In so far as strategy in the field of cultural relations is concerned, the following modifications of our program might be weighed carefully:

First, shifting to the German scene itself of the Voice of America, which is now operated much too far away from the arena where the fighting is being done. If directed with imagination, courage and skill by someone able to draw from ruined German cities the needed intellectual resources, it could become a wellspring of intellectual vitality and moral virility.

Second, frank realization of the cultural barriers which separate us from the German people. For example, as time goes on we shall be saddled with more and more responsibility for cultural damage which might have been avoided and is now well-nigh irreparable. With the passing of time, people

may forget that their women were once maltreated by Russian soldiers, but the ruins of great shrines will continue to bear witness. It might be worth the effort to restore Wuerzburg, which ought never to have been bombarded into rubble.

Third, abrogation of all unnecessary and piddling educational reforms. That sort of thing our Army was never designed to accomplish, and harping on its importance merely tends to make us seem ridiculous.

Fourth, mustering private help in the United States on a much larger scale than has hitherto been envisaged in order to foster German educational reconstruction. Germany is, if we wish it or not, our colony and we must do there something comparable to what we did in the Philippines.

Finally, culling out mediocrity from the offices concerned with culture and sending replacements which, while numerically less striking, will be from the qualitative point of view impressive.

In all probability we shall be over there a long while. There is no point in spending time, energy and money unless we can be reasonably sure that what we secure in return can be marketed at a fair price. In short it is too early to rejoice and not too late for hope. But the clock will not stand still.

REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN

CHAIRMAN SHOTWELL: Professor Shuster, we are grateful for this stimulating and very challenging survey of conditions in Germany which you have given us. I am sure it will open the door for discussion later on. I hope so.

The next speaker, Brigadier General Telford Taylor, will speak to us with absolute authority on the subject assigned to him: "War Crimes Trials: An Appraisal".

General Taylor was Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, U.S. Office of Military Government, after experience in Washington—which I hope prepares one for such serious obligations abroad.

THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS: AN APPRAISAL

BRIGADIER GENERAL TELFORD TAYLOR

Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, Office of Military Government (U. S.)

IN April 1949 judgment was rendered in the thirteenth and last Nuremberg trial, variously known as the "Foreign Office", "Ministries", or "Wilhelmstrasse" case. While the convicted defendants may still seek clemency from the military governor, the judgment itself is final, and marks the close of the "Nuremberg process".

Nuremberg has been hailed as a milestone in the development of international law and the evolution of international morality, and damned as a wreaking of vengeance by the perversion of justice. The basic integrity of the proceedings has been impugned as an unworthy exercise of the victor's might—a "trial of the vanquished by the victors"—and several of the Nuremberg principles, notably the concept of the crime of aggressive warfare, have been challenged as *ex post facto* in character, and therefore legally invalid. These problems have been repeatedly and heatedly explored both in the popular press and in learned journals of opinion, and the general nature of the dispute is divined, if not understood, by the reading public. The writer is not without views on these matters, but sees little to be gained by rehearsing them here.

Profoundly important as these jurisprudential problems are, the question whether the Nuremberg trials should have taken place, or should have been different, has faded into the realm of the hypothetical. The Nuremberg record has been written and the judgments rendered. Some Germans, recently accused of murder and other heinous crimes, are free men today, acquitted of the charges. Others are serving long sentences in Landsberg prison, where Adolph Hitler wrote *Mein Kampf*, and still others have been hanged by the neck until dead. For better or worse, Nuremberg is a *fait accompli*. Rather than debate endlessly whether the trials should or should not have

been held, we must now seek to grasp the practical significance of Nuremberg today and its probable influence in time to come.

As a subject for appraisal, Nuremberg is protean. A lawyer will view the trials as the focus of many novel and difficult legal questions, both substantive and procedural. The political scientist will perhaps see them as a fascinating study of dictatorship in the modern world. The historian will find their chief value in the wealth of documentation—both official and personal—which the trials brought to light, and in the verbal testimony of the diplomats and politicians and generals and other leading figures in the era of the Third Reich. All scholars and professional men will find much of interest and value in the trial records. But Nuremberg also has a vital bearing—both immediate and long-term—on world affairs. The trials have been a part of our foreign policy, and a leading feature of our occupation of Germany. From a study of the trials and of German reaction to the trials, much insight may be gained which is necessary to the foresighted and imaginative shaping of foreign policy.

The Nuremberg Record

The Nuremberg trials, of course, are only a few among the great number of war crimes trials that have been held during the four years since the end of the war. In Germany, crimes against American troops, and crimes committed in concentration camps overrun by American troops, were tried before United States Army tribunals sitting at Dachau near Munich. The defendants at Dachau included the perpetrators of the notorious Malmedy massacre, the custodians of the Dachau, Flossenbergl and Buchenwald concentration camps (Ilse Koch was one of these), and a great number of German soldiers and civilians accused of "lynching" American aviators who had bailed out over or crash-landed in Germany. Also many trials have been held in all the countries formerly occupied by Germany, in which the defendants were usually civilian, S.S., or military officials of the German occupational administration. Similar trials have been in progress in the Far East against Japanese officers and officials, as well as the big international trial at Tokyo, which was concluded last November.

In examining the legal and moral questions involved in the war crimes prosecutions, all of these cases must be considered

in conjunction with the Nuremberg trials. So, too, will the political scientist and the historian find rewarding material in these other cases. But the writer's personal experience in this field has been confined to Nuremberg and, in any event, the session this morning is devoted to an examination of our German policy, so it will be fitting to confine this appraisal to the thirteen cases which constituted the "Nuremberg process".

The best-known of the Nuremberg cases is, of course, the first, which was held before a tribunal composed of judges from the four Great Powers—United States, United Kingdom, France and Soviet Union—charged with the occupation of Germany. This trial was held under the authority of an international agreement, known as the London Charter of 8 August 1945, in which were set forth the principles of international law applied at Nuremberg. Perhaps the three fundamental and most significant principles embodied in the London Charter and later confirmed by the judgment of the International Military Tribunal are: first, that there are certain standards of conduct, generally observed in civilized countries, which all men are bound *as a matter of international law* to observe; second, that men who violate these international standards are criminals and may be convicted and punished under international law by tribunals established to enforce that law; and third, that these standards proscribe and make criminal under international law the deliberate planning and launching of an aggressive war, violations of the laws and customs of war generally observed among belligerents, and certain categories of inhumane persecutions of racial, religious, or other groups.

Of course the legal and moral problems which derive from these very general principles are legion, and many are of profound and searching consequence. What if the very laws of a supposedly civilized state conflict with these principles? What weight shall be attached to the circumstance that the accused individual was acting under the pressure of orders from a superior, or the stress of fear? How should we define and delimit the area of personal criminal responsibility for wars and atrocities?

Many angles of these questions were dealt with in the first Nuremberg trial, and many more in the twelve which followed. The first trial was chiefly concerned with the deeds of the sur-

viving topmost Nazis (Goering, Hess and Ribbentrop) and prominent Nazi administrators and officials (Sauckel, Speer, Frick and others). It did not furnish the basis for full inquiry into the degree of responsibility attributable to many others who were not "professional Nazis" but occupied key positions in the Third Reich, such as career diplomats, doctors, lawyers and judges, business men, and military leaders. A few of the defendants in the first trial did, to be sure, fall in these categories: two generals (Keitel and Jodl) and two admirals (Raeder and Doenitz) were tried and all four were convicted; the professional diplomat von Neurath was also convicted but the elusive von Papen was acquitted, as was the government financier Schacht. Gustav Krupp was indicted, but could not be tried because of physical and mental infirmities.

The twelve ensuing Nuremberg trials were also held under international authority, as embodied in an enactment, designated Control Council Law No. 10, which was promulgated on 10 December 1945 by the Allied Control Council for Germany. Law No. 10 is based on the same general principles as the London Charter, and authorized the establishment of tribunals in each of the four zones of occupation, for the trial of war criminals and similar offenders. In order to give effect to this law in the American Zone, in October 1946 the military governor (then General McNarney) directed that "military tribunals" be established at Nuremberg, and appointed the writer as chief of counsel to determine what individuals should be tried, prepare the indictments, and direct the prosecution. The tribunals were composed of three members each (occasionally with an alternate member), most of them professional judges who were or had been members of state appellate or trial benches.

In the twelve cases heard before these tribunals, 177 individuals were indicted and tried. Nearly half of these were defendants of the same general type that had filled the dock in the first trial—that is, they were S.S. leaders (Otto Ohlen-dorf, Oswald Pohl, Gottlob Berger and some 60 other S.S. officials) or high Nazi administrators and functionaries (Darre, Lammers, Dietrich, and others). But other defendants charged with and convicted of murder and other serious crimes were not primarily politicians and were not outstandingly "Nazi" in the narrow organizational sense—some were not

even party members. For example, in the well-known "Medical Case" the defendants—accused of performing atrocious medical experiments on unwilling concentration camp inmates—included not only such Nazis as Hitler's personal physician (Dr. Karl Brandt) and the Chief Surgeon of the S.S. (Dr. Karl Gebhardt), but also an internationally famous specialist in tropical medicine (Dr. Gerhard Rose) and two eminent military physicians who had risen to the top medical positions in the German Army and Air Force (Drs. Siegfried Handloser and Oskar Schroeder). The well-known diplomat Ernst von Weizsaecker and other career members of the German Foreign Office shared the dock with Lammers and Darre. Three cases were concerned with the responsibility for slave labor, economic plunder, and other crimes borne by prominent German industrialists, notably Alfried Krupp, Friedrich Flick, and their respective associates in heavy industry, and the directors of the gigantic I. G. Farben chemicals combine. In two other cases some twenty field marshals and generals were convicted of wholesale violations of the laws of war. Professional judges were tried in the so-called "Justice Case", along with the prominent jurist Franz Schlegelberger, who had served as Acting Reichsminister of Justice during the war.

To summarize, some 200 individuals were tried in the thirteen Nuremberg cases, of whom 38 were acquitted, nearly the same number condemned to death, and the remainder sentenced to prison terms of varying duration (eighteen months to life). In addition to the top Nazis, the defendants included prominent industrialists, military leaders, civil servants, and professional men who were personally involved in the conquests and atrocities of the Third Reich. Nuremberg has been an enterprise of great dimensions, both physically and conceptually. As indicated earlier, it is a very complex phenomenon, and cannot be appraised from the judicial angle alone. But we will view it first as a lawyer might, before sketching its interest to scholars and its broad political significance.

Nuremberg in Law

The legal profession, of course, will debate the pros and cons of the Nuremberg principles and procedures for some years to come. Especially in Germany, where nationalism and national pride may be expected to sharpen the critical edge, we will

continue to witness attacks on the fairness of the proceedings, and to hear much of the maxim *nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege* and of jurisdictional objections to the trials, no doubt with great emphasis laid on the Soviet government's participation in the first trial.

The legal procedures at Nuremberg were largely the product of evolution based on actual experience there. Certainly some difficult and unusual problems arose out of the mixture of different legal systems and the novelty of the situation, and there is room for honest differences of opinion on a number of points. But the fundamental fairness of the trials was patent to the observer and will, I believe, be apparent to anyone who examines the record of the proceedings. Undoubtedly Nuremberg will, in Mr. Justice Jackson's words, "commend itself to posterity as fulfilling humanity's aspirations to do justice", but how soon this will be true of German posterity depends very largely on the political future of that country.

Looking forward instead of backward, however, legal students of the Nuremberg process will undoubtedly be most interested in three general problems. First, what are the metes and bounds of the crimes themselves? Second, what is the area of individual criminal responsibility? Third, what sort of permanent international tribunals should be established to try such cases in the future, and what procedures are best suited to such international trials?

Clearly, each of these topics offers ample scope for many books, and herein can at most be barely outlined. The concept of planning or launching aggressive war, for example, has now been dealt with in five Nuremberg judgments, as well as at Tokyo and in an important but little-noticed decision by a war crimes tribunal in the French occupation zone (*Affaire Roebbling*, 25 January 1949). These seven decisions are not in all respects mutually consistent, and leave the scope of this crime undetermined in many important respects. Likewise, the laws and usages of war, as found in the Hague and Geneva Conventions and other sources, have been interpreted and applied in all the Nuremberg judgments. The analysis of such topics as reprisals, hostages, economic plunder, deportation, forced labor, partisans and guerillas, and the definition of crimes related to these topics, can and should now be approached in the light of this wealth of new material, for the

laws of war are in sad need of restatement. Most important of all, however, is the question of the extent to which atrocities committed *in peacetime*, by or with the approval or toleration of a government, against a racial, religious or other group of its own inhabitants are to be regarded as crimes under international law. Here we must resolve the conflict between national sovereignty and world-wide law; the path to an intelligent and workable solution is fraught with grave difficulties, but the outcome will have immediate and vital bearing on the preservation of world peace, to which these atrocities and persecutions are a constant and terrible menace.

Marking out the area of responsibility for these crimes is nearly as difficult and searching a task as defining the crimes themselves. It is a basic principle that the essential elements of crime are *action* and *guilty state of mind*, but how shall we apply this principle to the crime of planning or waging aggressive war? What kind of action and what degree of knowledge are necessary? If we turn to war crimes and atrocities the principal questions are: how close must the defendant's own personal relation to the crime be, and what is the legal effect of extenuating circumstances, such as superior orders or fear of the Gestapo? As to the first question, for example, all the directors of I. G. Farben were charged with complicity in the Auschwitz concentration camp atrocities, and it was shown that I. G. Farben had constructed a synthetic rubber plant adjacent to Auschwitz with the deliberate intention of utilizing the inmates as forced labor, and that working conditions on the Farben factory site were cruel and inhumane and many deaths resulted. Although the entire Farben directorate had approved the Auschwitz factory project, a majority (two) of the members of the Nuremberg Tribunal held that only those few (four directors out of twenty) who were personally and closely involved in its planning and execution were criminally responsible; the other directors were acquitted of the charge. The third member (Judge Paul M. Hebert, Dean of the Law School at the University of Louisiana) dissented vigorously, and declared that all the Farben directors "knowingly participated in the shaping of the corporate policy" and "must share the responsibility".

As to the second question, we may take as a good illustration the charge brought against the proprietors and directors of the

Krupp and Flick heavy industry combines that they had knowingly employed in their plants thousands of Frenchmen and Poles and Russians who had been forcibly deported from their homelands, and were therefore guilty of the crime of enslaving all these deportees, as well as mistreating many of them. The industrialists answered that the use of forced foreign labor in German plants was an official government policy, and that they would have been subjected to severe punishment—confiscation of property or imprisonment—had they refused to use the labor. This is the so-called defense of *necessity* or *duress*, rarely adjudicated in civilized, democratic countries because the situation is unusual. The Nuremberg decisions are, therefore, the first in this field, and deal with a question of fundamental importance in international penal law: what are the limits of personal guilt for acts committed under and in line with the policies of a dictatorial, tyrannical government? A passage (read by Presiding Judge Hu C. Anderson, of the Tennessee bench) from the Nuremberg judgment in the Krupp case may well stand as an authoritative precedent for years to come. The court said:

... the question from the standpoint of the individual defendants resolves itself into this proposition: To avoid losing my job or the control of my property, I am warranted in employing thousands of civilian deportees, prisoners of war, and concentration camp inmates, keeping them in a state of involuntary servitude; exposing them daily to death or great bodily harm, under conditions which did in fact result in the deaths of many of them; and working them in an undernourished condition in the production of armament intended for use against the... people of their homelands.

If we may assume that as a result of opposition to Reich policies, Krupp would have lost control of his plant and the officials their positions, it is difficult to conclude that the law of necessity justified a choice favorable to themselves and against the unfortunate victims who had no choice at all in the matter. Or, in the language of the rule, that the remedy was not disproportionate to the evil. In this connection it should be pointed out that there is very respectable authority for the view that the fear of the loss of property will not make the defense of duress available.

But the extreme possibility hinted at was that Gustav Krupp and his officials would not only have lost control of the plant but

would have been put in a concentration camp had they refused to adopt the illegal measures necessary to meet the production quotas.

... in all fairness it must be said that in any view of the evidence the defendants, in a concentration camp, would not have been in a worse plight than the thousands of helpless victims whom they daily exposed to danger of death and great bodily harm from starvation and the relentless air raids upon the armament plants to say nothing of involuntary servitude and the other indignities which they suffered. The disparity in the number of the actual and potential victims is also thought provoking.

The foregoing is the merest sketch of two of the major topics arising out of the Nuremberg trials which will draw the attention of lawyers the world over. We have not yet touched upon the third, to wit, the planning of a permanent international judicial system for the trial of future violators of international penal law, and the devising of an international legal procedure appropriate to such an international judicial forum. As to the latter problem, the practical experience at Nuremberg, Tokyo and elsewhere should be invaluable. The actual establishment of a permanent international tribunal will, for obvious reasons arising out of the unsettled state of world affairs, encounter formidable political obstacles.

Nuremberg in Scholarship

When we speak of the importance of Nuremberg to scholars in fields other than law, we may mean one of two things. The trials themselves are a unique and arresting episode with profound philosophical and moral implications, and they will figure prominently in the history of modern times. But we are speaking here not of the trials as such, but of the documents and testimony which have become available to scholars as a result of the trials.

In numerous branches of science and culture, the record of one or more of the Nuremberg cases will be found of especial interest. The "Medical Case", of course, has attracted much attention among physicians and scientists. Even the trials of S.S. leaders have revealed much more than the appalling record of atrocities; ethnologists, sociologists and psychiatrists, for example, will do well to study the documents and testimony offered in the case involving the "Race and Resettlement Of-

fice" of the S.S., which concerned itself chiefly with the selection of so-called "racially valuable" foreign children for "Germanization", and the transfer of populations in order to resettle desirable regions with "ethnic Germans".

It is to the historian and the political scientist, however, that the trials have most to offer. No well-rounded study of German or European affairs from 1920 to 1945 can be made without taking account of the revealing and profuse documentation offered in the trials of diplomats, industrialists and military leaders. A wide selection of documents from the German Foreign Office archives has been made public in the course of the "Wilhelmstrasse" trial, just now being concluded at Nuremberg. These shed new light on many subjects, including especially the *Anschluss*, the Munich crisis, and the relations between the Third Reich and Vichy France. The background and over-all strategy of German rearmament are laid bare in the records of the Krupp and I. G. Farben trials, and from these and the military cases can be gathered the true inwardness of the relations between Hitler and the German generals and industrial leaders. The diaries of Generals Jodl and Halder are documents of prime historical importance for the years from 1937 to 1942; the Blomberg-Fritsch crisis, the decision not to attempt an invasion of England in 1940, and the strategy which led to and guided the invasion of Soviet Russia are among the topics greatly illuminated by these amazing documents.

For the political scientist, the Nuremberg story of the rise and fall of the Third Reich provides a sort of historical laboratory in which he can dissect a dictatorship and examine its structure and internal functioning. This study is no academic essay; dictatorship is still playing a leading rôle on the world stage, and the analysis of its strengths and weaknesses is vital to military and political planning for peace or war alike. Furthermore, even on this side of the iron curtain there is a feeling in some quarters that perhaps dictatorship is not so bad under certain circumstances. The Nazis succeeded in convincing some people that their system, although ruthless, was absolutely efficient; that, although savage, it was completely systematic—that "it got things done." If there is any one lesson above all others to be drawn from the Nuremberg trials, it is that this notion of the "efficiency" of the Nazi dictatorship is 99 per cent myth.

Nuremberg in Germany

The teaching of this lesson can help to strengthen democracy everywhere, but nowhere is there more urgent need that it be learned than in Germany at this very time. Nowhere can the records of the Nuremberg trials be put to more immediate or better use than in German schools and universities, and in German books and magazines. Nowhere have historians and political scientists and educators—here and in the other democracies and Germany alike—so tremendous an opportunity to grasp or so grave a responsibility to discharge as irrigating the cultural and intellectual desert which the Third Reich made of Germany.

In meeting this most vital need of the times, the Nuremberg record is an indispensable tool. It is not meant by this that the Germans must endorse the Nuremberg principles and procedures uncritically, or accept the judgments unquestioningly. Here again, it is not the verdict but the record of documents and testimony that is most important.

The ultimate objective of American foreign policy is to bring about a stable and enduring world peace and free intercourse among nations. Soviet Russia and Germany, as powerful dictatorships, have been the greatest obstacles to the success of our policy, and if our principal positive aim with respect to Russia is to lift the curtain, our chief purpose in Germany must be to fill the vacuum. And now is the time. The Germans are beginning to shake off their post-war intellectual apathy, and there is a noticeable revival of the life of the mind. Recent history and politics are, of course, the focus of interest. But there are no textbooks or histories dealing with recent European history available in Germany today; the Nazi books are banned and no new ones have yet appeared.

This most disastrous void in the educational field has now lasted nearly four years. We should have started filling it long ago and must commence without further delay. But when these histories are written, what will they say, for example, about the background of the Munich crisis? Will they include only what the German people were told in 1938, during the months leading up to Munich? Will they suggest that Czech atrocities against the Sudeten Germans justified the German demands? Or will the German history books include

the account by Hitler's own adjutant of the fateful conference in November 1937 when Hitler revealed to the German commanders-in-chief his desire to annex Czechoslovakia? Will they mention the German Foreign Office documents which prove that the Sudeten Germans were under direct orders from Berlin to "provoke" incidents? These documents and hundreds of others—which became available when they were offered in evidence at Nuremberg, and most of which have been authenticated and explained or qualified by the very men who wrote them and whose conduct is described therein—must be utilized to the full in writing German history, if the Germans of tomorrow are to grasp the truth about the past.

Even more important, what are the Germans thinking today, as political interest and activity revive, about the relative merits of dictatorship and democracy? Kathleen McLaughlin, Sidney Gruson and other reliable and perspicacious foreign correspondents for *The New York Times* reported, in a recent series of despatches (20 to 24 March), the prevalence among young Germans of a yearning for the interesting and exciting days of the Hitler Youth, utter indifference to our attempts at "democratic reeducation", and a stubborn belief that "it would be better for Germany if the Government were in the hands of one man."

If Germany again falls victim to this delusion, it will be because the lesson of Nuremberg has not, even yet, sunk in; for the Nuremberg record provides, above all, an eloquent demonstration of the terrible handicaps under which any nation, burdened by dictatorship, labors. Few of us fully realize what a lethal smog settled over science and education and all forms of cultural activity under the Third Reich. It is a startling but most significant fact that the Nazi dictatorship was not even efficient at being totalitarian; German economic mobilization for war was incomplete and unsystematic, and lagged far behind our own, late-comers to the war though we were. Out of an abundance of striking illustrations of this general theme, perhaps the most telling is the decline in the standards of German medicine, as demonstrated in the Nuremberg "Medical Case", which dealt with 20-odd leading German doctors accused of performing murderous and inhuman medical experiments using human beings as guinea pigs. One of these experiments was performed for the benefit of the German Air

Force which, like our own Air Force, was vitally interested in methods of making sea water drinkable, for use in air-sea rescue work. The Germans had a perfectly good method for removing the salt from sea water, which of course made the water drinkable, but this method required large amounts of silver, of which Germany was very short. Another technique had been developed which did not remove the salt, but only concealed the salty taste. One would have supposed that elementary chemistry would have sufficed to demonstrate that it is the salt and not the taste that makes sea water poisonous to drink. But German medicine had become slipshod in technique, and these doctors careless of human life and insensitive to suffering. So, by direction of the Chief of the German Air Force Medical Service, forty unfortunate concentration camp inmates were tortured within an inch of their lives by being made to drink this treated but still salty sea water for a week or more. Performance of this brutal and stupid experiment was delayed for even stupider reasons; these doctors, supposedly men of science, had fallen victim to Nazi racial myths and debated endlessly whether Gypsies were enough like German aviators so that they could be used as test subjects.

It took much time, effort and staff to carry out this cruel and utterly useless test. Letters had to be written, conferences attended, reports prepared, and physicians, of whom there was a dire shortage in the German armed forces, were taken out of hospitals and sent hundreds of miles to obtain an answer to a problem which should have been solved in a few hours of laboratory work. But such waste and inefficiency were the inevitable result of the degradation of German medical standards and ethics under dictatorship. The chairs of medicine at many universities had been filled with Nazi party hacks, and medical students had to waste much time in party activities. The scientific spirit was distorted by Nazi racial theories, and medical students' heads were filled with racial mumbo jumbo. Psychiatry, for example, suffered because Freud and other famous exponents were Jewish. One interesting result was that the German Army Medical Service failed miserably in treating combat fatigue, because its methods of psychotherapy were ruined by the infusion of Nazi doctrine; this resulted in the surrender of many nervously exhausted German soldiers, and prevented the rehabilitation and restoration to duty of many others.

After studying the entire record of the "Medical Case", the eminent physician Dr. Andrew C. Ivy (Vice-President of the University of Illinois) concluded: "A true scientist must be a moral and an honest man, in the highest meaning of these words. The German scientists had become immoral and dishonest, therefore their achievements were of a pseudo-scientific character."¹ Dr. Ivy dealt with medical science, but one example after another could be cited to prove the validity of his judgment in other branches of science, in law, and in military and economic affairs. It is only human nature to learn faster and more thoroughly from mistakes that harm one's self than from those that harm others, and perhaps the harvest of hatred which Germany reaped in the occupied countries will, in the long run, not impress the German mind so much as the ravaging consequences of the Third Reich within Germany—consequences which are only too terribly apparent to anyone who reads the Nuremberg record.

Nuremberg in the Future

As the years pass, the Nuremberg documentation will be merged with other collections, and Nuremberg will eventually lose its unique value to the scholar as a source of historical material. So, too, the personalities and episodes with which Nuremberg was concerned will blur and fade, and only a few will win lasting historical notice. To appraise the enduring stature of Nuremberg in the world of tomorrow we must, I suggest, return to the topic of international morality and the rule of law among nations.

One thing, for certain, is abundantly clear. From the very outset, the fundamental principle of all war crimes trials, at Nuremberg and elsewhere, has been that they are a *judicial* process for the enforcement of *law* which is binding on all men. This was manifest in the very first international declaration on the subject—the "St. James Declaration" of nine European countries at London in January 1942—which called for the punishment of war criminals "through the channels of organized justice." The London Agreement of 1945, under the authority of which the first Nuremberg trial was held, is squarely bottomed on the proposition: "...that the criminal

¹ In his foreword to *Doctors of Infamy—The Story of the Nazi Medical Crimes* (1949), p. xii.

character of...acts could not depend on who committed them and that international crimes could only be defined in broad terms applicable to statesmen of any nation guilty of the proscribed conduct."²

Four nations signed the London Charter and Control Council Law No. 10—the two jurisdictional cornerstones of the Nuremberg trials—and nineteen other nations formally announced their adherence to the principles embodied therein. Thousands of Germans and Japanese have been tried under those principles, and those found guilty have been punished.

The inference is clear. All nations who have approved or applied these principles are under grave moral obligation to participate in planning and supporting the establishing of permanent international judicial machinery for their enforcement. That the task is difficult, and that contemporary political obstacles seem more than formidable, is true. But failure to make sustained and hopeful efforts will stultify the principles we have proclaimed, and it must not be forgotten that the United States took the lead in formulating those principles and in establishing the Nuremberg tribunals for their enforcement. As Dr. Philip Jessup has penetratingly observed, "Law alone is not enough. It will not operate in a sovereign vacuum",³ and our failure to press for the establishment of a permanent international tribunal of general jurisdiction will surely be taken—particularly by the Germans and Japanese—as "an assertion that aggressive war is *not* a crime and that the individual who is guilty of endangering the international public repose is *not* to be treated as a criminal."

It would be a mistake, however, to look at this task primarily as our obligation, rather than our opportunity. It has been well said that "the fundamental problem confronting the world is to establish world order under the rule of law."⁴ But the world cannot be expected suddenly to take shape as a con-

² Justice Jackson's preface to Department of State Publication 3080, *International Conference on Military Trials*, p. viii.

³ "The Crime of Aggression and the Future of International Law", by Philip C. Jessup, *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. LXII, No. 1 (March 1947), pp. 4, 9.

⁴ *A Project for a World School of Law*, published by the Harvard Law School (1948), p. 5.

stitutional republican government, with a legislature and electorate, separation of powers, and all the intricate paraphernalia of modern national democracies, developed so painfully over the course of centuries. International law and government are still in infancy, if not the womb. We do not gag the infant because his speech is inarticulate and he cannot comprehend Latin maxims, nor do we bind him because his steps are tottering and he often falls. Yet it sometimes seems that critics of the Nuremberg idea have reacted in just that fashion, and have gauged it by comparison with highly developed modern governments, and by standards which were not attained until after centuries of practical experience, and the gradual growth of the law case by case. And therein lies the true significance of Nuremberg in time to come. Here is a series of great cases which, in a very few years, have added enormously to the body and the living reality of international penal law. Here the whole world has been able to see the international judicial process in action. It is in these terms that the ultimate appraisal of Nuremberg will be made.

REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN

CHAIRMAN SHOTWELL: Thank you for this penetrating analysis of the greatest pioneering effort in history to extend the reign of law over that part of civilization which still practices anarchy in the exercise of war.

There are many problems which we will hope to consider in our discussion later.

The last speaker this morning comes with high qualifications, indeed, to deal with this subject: a doctor of laws of Frankfort, Lecturer in a German School of Politics, and Doctor of Philosophy in the University of London; Special Assistant in the European Research Division of the Office of Strategic Services, and Chief of the German Research Section of the Department of State during 1946 and 1947. He is now, I am proud to say, one of our colleagues at Columbia University. Dr. Franz Neumann.

GERMANY AND WESTERN UNION

FRANZ NEUMANN

Visiting Professor of Government, Columbia University

WE cannot discuss Germany's relation to Western Union abstractly. The discussion is meaningful only within a specific frame, namely, that of the relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R.—more specifically, within the frame set by the foreign policy of the United States.

As I see our foreign policy, it may be defined as follows:

1. avoidance of the transformation of the cold into a hot war;
2. containment of the U.S.S.R. as a short-range proposition;
3. a settlement with the U.S.S.R. on terms favorable to us;
4. creation of a strong, viable Western Europe;
5. the defense of Western Europe—economic, political, military—against the possibility of armed attack by the U.S.S.R.

I shall not question these five propositions but shall rather try to clarify the position of Germany within this frame of reference.

(1) From these propositions, the following argument could be deduced. Germany (in this case, Western Germany), with its 45 million inhabitants, its tremendous industrial potential, its great technological skill, its famous organizational experience, its manpower, its training in hierarchy, obedience and discipline, is the most important link in the establishment of a viable economic, political and military Europe. To be successful in our policy, therefore, requires the removal of all restrictions on Germany; the incorporation of Germany into the Western Union, the entry of Germany into the Atlantic Pact system; and the rearmament of Germany. This argument is still very rarely heard, but I have no doubt that it will be heard with increasing frequency and with growing intensity.

(2) It is thus paramount to analyze the consequences of this argument and to show the probable results of a policy derived from it.

I shall abstain from discussing the implications and repercussions of such policy upon the United States and, rather, confine myself to an analysis of the consequences for Western Europe and Germany.

(3) It is clear that the policy would constitute a decisive break with our traditional policy toward Germany.

Our previous policy toward Germany centered on six principles:

1. The United States desired a unified Germany;
2. neutral toward all big Powers;
3. economically viable;
4. but incapable of making war;
5. economically integrated in Europe and thus contributing to Europe's economic recovery;
6. governed democratically and securely committed to a democratic way of life.

As expressed in Secretary Byrnes's speech at Stuttgart (on September 6, 1946): "It is not in the interest of the German people or in the interest of world peace that Germany should become a pawn or a partner in a military struggle for power between the East and the West."

(4) It is said—and said by very serious people—that the old policy toward Germany was futile in any case. A "neutralized" Germany would be—so it is argued—a power vacuum; but a power vacuum cannot exist. It must be filled by someone. If the West will not fill it, the East will do so. I refuse to accept the validity of physical or biological laws for politics and political science. We know well the misuse perpetrated by the organic theories of state, or by the so-called "science of geopolitics" for partisan purposes. Politics is not governed by iron laws, but is made by man acting within an historical setting. A so-called "power vacuum", that is, a state without adequate military means, is possible if the contending big Powers will it. It is impossible if they do not; but the impossibility is clearly the product of a conscious decision and is not the result of an alleged law of international relations.

(5) It is with the consequences of such a decision—as yet hypothetical—that I am concerned.

The impact on France would be obvious. With the assistance of the Marshall Plan, and against the expectations of many professional forecasters and political analysts, the Third Force government has maintained itself in power. I do not predict that it will stay in power. It is by no means immune from accidents. We have nursed that government along. We have seen a dwindling of Communist strength and a decline of de Gaulle's popularity. We know (or can guess) that the Third Force government and particularly the French Socialist party are, on the whole, in agreement with American policy toward Germany. That they are reluctant to say so and to follow us is due precisely to France's internal position—to the Communist and the de Gaullist movements. Both appear as the protagonists and defenders of the traditional French security policy toward Germany which aims essentially at Germany's political fragmentation. The attempt to have Germany enter the Western Union or even to bring her within the Atlantic Pact, with the prospect of her remilitarization, would unquestionably strengthen either the Communist party or the R.P.F. or both, and would, in addition, frighten off the very groups from which we have expected the creation of a viable democratic France, that is, the Socialist party, the M.R.P., and the Radical Socialists and their allies.

Since I belong to those who, since 1946, have confidently expected a shrinking of Communist strength and have consistently discarded a Communist danger, I believe the beneficiaries to be de Gaulle's R.P.F.

(6) Two arguments may be raised in opposition to my reasoning:

- (1) that once de Gaulle is in power, he will, if he is safely installed, be more amenable and able to accept our German policy than an uncertain Third Force government;
- (2) that Germany's incorporation into the Western Union will remove, once for all, a German threat to France's security.

(7) Let me turn to the first argument. I do not doubt that de Gaulle, if his ascent to power should depend upon his conforming to a new German policy, will secretly give all assurances required from him. Whether he will honor them

is a different problem, but that is not decisive. A de Gaullist victory cannot possibly be measured by the yardstick of a German policy. Much more is at stake. At stake is the survival of French democracy. We have an ideological and political interest in French democracy. Why we have an ideological interest needs hardly to be stated here; our political interest lies in the very fact of our sponsorship of a Western Union which cannot successfully operate if it be composed of a democratic Great Britain and an authoritarian France.

Let us not be deceived. The bulk of French Socialists, trade unionists, the Left Catholics (such as represented by *L'Esprit*), and the true liberals are as violently opposed to de Gaulle as are the Communists; and perhaps more so.

It is thus for the sake of French democracy that a policy of incorporating Germany now into the Western Union should not be followed.

(8) The second objection is being formulated as follows: Once Germany is a member of the Western Union, national conflicts and hatreds will die; the old security considerations of France will lose all validity. A specious but shallow argument!

Let me answer this argument by comparing Western Union with a cartel.

Cartel advocates—and particularly German cartel advocates—tell us that the cartel is a higher and more rational form of economic organization. Wasteful and ruinous competition, they say, is replaced by harmonious coöperation. This may be true—and is quite frequently true—where the cartel members have about equal economic strength. But what happens in a cartel where that is not the case, where there is one powerful member with a score of weak members? A desperate fight ensues within the cartel. The struggle for quotas—production and sales quotas—is far more bitter than the competition of free entrepreneurs; and what is the result of the struggle for quotas? One need only look into the German steel, coal, chemical and potash industries where cartellization was merely the device for the creation of huge and powerful trusts.

Let us apply this example to Germany's entry into the Western Union. The country with a steel potential larger than that of any other country in Europe, with such a coal and chemical industry, with a machine-tool industry already

more powerful than that of France, and potentially more powerful than that of England, is to become a partner of a Western Union.

Will she accept there for any length of time a secondary status? Will she not aspire to the leading position within the Western Union.

To answer these questions, we must look into Germany's internal make-up and discuss the impact of her membership in the Western Union upon her domestic politics.

(9) We are informed—especially during the last weeks—that German nationalism is rising. Mr. Drew Middleton, in the *New York Times*, has drawn a particularly ugly picture of the Bavarian situation.

What is this German nationalism? How does it express itself? How do we recognize it?

(10) Is it the desire for a unified Germany? Definitely no. That Germans want restoration of a unified Germany is natural, and not only natural, but from my point of view desirable. No blame can possibly be attached to this demand. We would be hypocrites if we were to deny to the Germans a form of political life which we claim for ourselves.

(11) Is it the demand for a strong central government and the rejection of an extreme federalism that characterize the Germans as nationalistic? Definitely no. You know that the German Social Democratic party has rejected the scheme to reduce the projected Western government to a mere agent of the various state governments and has demanded that the new central government receive adequate financial powers. I do not want to discuss here the technical details but merely the principle involved.

The widespread belief that federalism is democratic and centralism authoritarian is neither theoretically correct nor historically tenable. Where did National Socialism grow? In centralist Prussia ruled by a Social Democratic-Catholic-Liberal coalition or in particularist Bavaria? Why did Germans advocate particularism as a specialized form of federalism between 1918 and 1933? Because they loved democracy? No. Because they hated it.

When the Communists controlled Brunswick for a short time they became particularists and even secessionists. When certain West German bankers and business men played with

the idea of a Rhineland state they did so hoping to avoid the burdens of reparations and of defeat. When the Bavarian government defied the German central government, it did so because it refused to punish traitors and to execute the Law for the Protection of the Republic.

Particularism in Germany was a device to create reactionary preserves in the midst of social and political progress. Let us not forget that the creation of a national financial administration of the Weimar Republic was the work of Matthias Erzberger, the leading Catholic Democrat, who paid with his life for his convictions.

It is regrettable that the discussion of the structure of the future German government should be dominated by doctrinaire conceptions. The issue is a pragmatic-political one. We in our zone of occupation discovered, happily enough not too late, that the fragmentation of our zone into separate states held together solely by Military Government and a Council of States made economic recovery difficult. A new German government must receive as much power—not more and not less—as is necessary to create a viable economy which is not subject to sabotage by state governments motivated by particularist interests.

The demand raised especially by the German Social Democracy that the new government receive these powers cannot be termed “nationalistic”.

(12) Can we say that the protests against dismantling, against the international control of the Ruhr, against the frontier changes—in the East and the West—are manifestations of a new nationalism? The answer is no. Such protests are natural. It would be strange if there were none.

It is not nationalism to love one's country and to desire the restoration of its unity, its integrity and its prosperity.

(13) Nationalism—as we associate it with Germany—lies in different aims; and, more particularly, lies in the methods pursued to achieve unity, integrity and independence.

(14) Let me come to the crucial point of the internal German problem: the attitude of Western Germany to the Western German state.

One should have expected that the German political leaders and the German population would have objected to the creation

of a Western German political organization as incompatible with their demand for a unified Germany. One would have expected the following argument: A Western German state means the perpetration of the split between East and West and must, therefore, be rejected. There are, apart from the Communists, quite a few who do so argue; but they are neither the majority nor the influential groups and leaders.

The latter accept the Western German state. They say: first, that one must take what one can get; second, that the Western German state is, in reality, the German state to which the states of the Eastern Zone may join whenever they feel like it or are permitted to do so. The first argument has some validity, the second is clearly untenable since it is evident that a Western German political organization makes unity more remote.

(15) But the true reason for the relative enthusiasm for a Western German state is a different one. The argument, which is but scarcely hidden, may be constructed in the following manner:

If we get a Western German state, we shall soon demonstrate to the world what our abilities are. We shall soon become indispensable to the West and to the United States. We shall get an army, become part of Western Union, as partners in the impending struggle with the East; we shall assume the military leadership of Western Europe, and shall thus create the unity of a Greater German Reich by blood and iron—to use Bismarck's phrase.

As an illustration, I shall mention but one debate: the discussion in Germany of Germany's international legal situation.

One would assume (from our experiences after World War I) that the Germans would attempt to prove that the laws of the Allied Control Council (and many of Military Government), and the creation of a completely new political structure in Germany, are incompatible with the Hague Convention's law of belligerent occupation. Some do indeed so argue. These are, on the whole, the traditional conservatives. But the majority of German lawyers argues differently. As yet, they do not question our actions. They assert that the activities of M.G. are legally valid because they are derived from a new international constitutional law of intervention which

authorizes the interference with the internal structure of any country for the sake of creating liberty and democracy. The meaning of these theories is quite obvious. The Germans accept, being temporary objects of intervention, hoping to become, in the not too distant future, partners in the intervention against another Power.

(16) It is, therefore, my conviction that the entry of Western Germany into a Western Union would strengthen the hands of those who desire to use Western Union merely as a stepping stone for the restoration of a Greater German Reich.

These groups are by no means weak. They have lain low, but they are gradually coming to the fore.

One of the indications of the growing power of the reactionary forces is the fate of the denazification policy. The great achievement of America's denazification policy has come to nothing. We could, indeed, be proud to be the sole nation which carried out its commitment to the letter. We executed JCS 1067 and the Allied Control Council legislation. No other Power could compare with the energy of our Military Government, with the spontaneity of our staff, and with the results which we achieved.

But we turned denazification over to the German authorities and had to witness the change from denazification to renazification. You find a very impressive documentation of this process in the December 1948 number of the *Political Science Quarterly*.

(17) Was the policy of a rapid transfer of responsibilities to German authorities wrong? Should we have kept the reins of direct rule longer in our hands?

No. The policy was correct simply because colonial rule of a highly intelligent nation for more than a very short period is an impossibility.

What was—and still is—wrong is that we turned the reins over to an unreconstructed Germany.

Nazism, militarism, aggression, are not inherent in the character of the German people. They are products of a structure which vitiated the attempts to create a viable democracy. Weimar democracy perished because the political form of democracy was imposed upon an authoritarian social and economic structure.

This structure stands in Western Germany. It stood from 1862 to 1939, from the day that Bismarck in the constitutional conflict defeated German liberalism and made it accept the boons derived from war instead of the benefits derived from peaceful domestic expansion, until the Nazis took over. It has been modified and strengthened by the Nazis. It disappeared from sight in 1945. But it remained.

Decartellization and the dissolution of combines are no substitutes for a radical reform.

This reform can be carried out only by those who, in the past, have shown that they are less susceptible to the attractions of conquest and foreign expansion than the traditional masters of Germany. I refer to the democratic labor movement, socialist, catholic, liberal. It is they, with all their weaknesses, their lack of militancy, their addiction to legality, who are the hope for a reconstructed Germany.

(18) To join an unreconstructed Germany to the Atlantic Pact or even to Western Union would play into the hands of reaction and weaken the very groups which, I hope, will be given more support by Military Government than they have received in the past.

There are groups in Germany which are fully aware of the problems which I have discussed. They repudiate—as did Secretary Byrnes—the attempts to get back to the rank of a Great Power with the assistance of the West or of the East. They oppose Eastern and Western orientations as instruments of power politics although they fully accept the Western tradition of liberty and democracy. It is the Socialists (best represented by Professor Alfred Weber) and Left Catholics (represented by the *Frankfurter Hefte*) who, in the words of Secretary Byrnes, do not want to become “pawns or partners” of the East or West, but who stand with the West in the defense of a democratic tradition and future.

(19) I have, in the beginning of my talk, stressed that I do not want to discuss the consequences of a radical reversal of our German policy for the general international situation. Let me confine myself to a few words. If we should join Germany to the Western Union or to the Atlantic Pact, the warning uttered by John Foster Dulles against the incorporation of Norway into the Atlantic security system would be infinitely

more applicable to the German situation. It would, by drawing Germany into a political or military security system, not only foreclose any possibility of settlement in the future, but it even might unleash the very war that we desire to prevent.

The door must, however, be left open for another reason: the policy of the U.S.S.R. in Eastern Germany is a dismal failure. Popular support for the Soviet Union and for its major political instrument, the Socialist Unity party, is at a low point and is dwindling. I have attempted to give a concrete analysis of the situation in the Soviet Zone of occupation at another place. If my analysis is correct, a settlement of the German problem might be had in the near future on terms outlined by Secretary Byrnes.

Those who oppose it are afraid, or say they are afraid, that a unified Germany, with a government of its own, will become a prey of the Communist party which will then conquer the whole of Germany from within. I do not quite know why one should ascribe to Communist parties superhuman qualities. Communism in Germany is weaker than anywhere in continental Europe—only recently did the Communists lose the Work Council elections in the Ruhr. I do not know of any case (save in Russia in 1917) where a Communist party, unaided by the Red Army, was able to conquer a country. Even Czechoslovakia was no exception.

There is no Communist threat in Germany, and communism in Germany will never come to power, if there is a viable democratic labor movement, unless installed by the U.S.S.R. from outside.

You will ask me—and justifiably so—what I suggest should be done. My answer will not appeal to those who want speedy and radical solutions.

If my analysis of the aims of United States foreign policy is correct, I would say this:

1. To strengthen German democracy, active support must be given to those groups who alone can build it, even if their economic philosophy should not be ours.
2. The Western German political organization should proceed unless our government feels that a possibility exists to settle the German problem in the near future. In this case, it should be postponed and the conflict between the

Western Powers over the occupation statute and between the Germans and the three Powers over the structure of the government would provide an excellent opportunity for postponement.

3. The economic integration of Western Germany with Western Europe appears unavoidable and necessary to speed German recovery and to assist the recovery of Europe. The difficulties of this are usually underestimated.
4. Germany should not join the Western Union.
5. Germany should not join the Atlantic Pact.
6. The door may thus be left ajar for a settlement in the future.

(20) I do not mean to say that Germany never should join Western Union. She should and she will. But three conditions must be fulfilled before Germany can become an equal partner in the military and political life of Western Europe:

1. France must have regained internal stability;
 2. Germany must be reconstructed;
 3. The intense international tension must have abated.
- This will be a long process, requiring hard and patient work.

I am afraid that this program and my analysis will prove unsatisfactory to those who feel that only a radical solution can be useful. But I believe that only such a program will be effective and that a radical break with it will merely lead to an attempt to drive the Devil out with Beelzebub.

REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN

CHAIRMAN SHOTWELL: Thank you, Professor Neumann for a thoughtful and statesmanlike presentation of these stimulating ideas.

This has been a memorable occasion. I think you will all agree with me.

PART II

ORGANIZING THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

INTRODUCTION *

JOHN A. KROUT, *Presiding*

Professor of History, Columbia University
Managing Editor, *Political Science Quarterly*

NONE of us could have been sure, when first this program was planned, that our subject, "Organizing the Atlantic Community", would have such a striking quality of timeliness as it possesses today.

There is a temptation to focus attention, in view of the events of recent weeks, on the North Atlantic Pact. But our subject really transcends both the terms and the implications of that notable document, however fateful they may be in the future. It challenges us to look beyond the situation of the moment toward the objectives of our common purpose. It offers a wide range of possibilities, only a few of which can be considered here this afternoon.

The very phrase "Atlantic Community" rests upon the idea of regional understanding. It is, therefore, appropriate that the first aspect of our topic is listed as "Regionalism and the United Nations".

Fortunately for us, we have Leland M. Goodrich, Professor of Political Science at Brown University, and, this year, Visiting Professor of International Organization and Administration at Columbia, to speak to us. He was for several years the Director of the World Peace Foundation. He has served in the past on the International Secretariat of the United Nations. He is author of the standard and indispensable work dealing with the organization and the functioning of the United Nations. Professor Leland M. Goodrich.

* Opening remarks at the Second Session of the Semi-Annual Meeting.

REGIONALISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS

LELAND M. GOODRICH

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THE North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on April 4, raises again the issue of the regional¹ versus the global approach to the organization of international peace and security. The question was posed at the time of the establishment of the League of Nations. President Wilson took a strong stand against limited leagues and alliances within the universal organization which he envisaged. He was convinced that limited alliances bred counteralliances and that the inevitable result was war. Nevertheless, he found it necessary, in order to reassure those who feared the sacrifice of the Monroe Doctrine, to make a concession to the regional point of view. Article 21 of the Covenant expressly recognized the validity of "regional understandings . . . for securing the maintenance of peace."

Limited or regional undertakings for mutual assistance against aggression came to play an important part in the evolution of the League system of collective security. Though the Covenant imposed upon member states specific commitments to take action against a state resorting to war in violation of its obligations, certain states, notably France, were far from satisfied with the adequacy of these guarantees. Failing to get general agreement on proposals to strengthen the League system, these principal consumers of security were instrumental in developing a system of limited and regional arrangements containing more specific military commitments than the Covenant provided. There is little evidence that these agreements

¹ The word "regionalism" is used primarily to describe arrangements between states that are geographically contiguous or situated within the same geographical area. It is, however, given a broader application at times, particularly in connection with security arrangements, for which practice there seems to be justification in the United Nations Charter.

This paper is also being published, in a somewhat expanded form, in the *Columbia Journal of International Affairs*, for which it was originally prepared.

contributed substantially to the maintenance of peace and security. Their influence within the League was divisive rather than unifying. They weakened the League as an instrument of orderly and peaceful change. When overt acts of aggression were committed, they proved to be wholly ineffective.

The failure of the League and the need to start afresh with the building of an international organization for peace and security afforded the opportunity to reconsider the merits of the global and regional approaches. Though the regional approach had strong advocates, as, for example, Prime Minister Churchill, it was not the view that finally prevailed in the preliminary exchanges between the principal allied governments. The Moscow Declaration of October 1943 envisaged a general international organization open to all peace-loving states. The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals spelled out in some detail this idea of a world organization to keep the peace.

To understand the United Nations peace and security system and the place of regionalism in it, it is necessary to have in mind some of the details of the plan which was agreed to at Dumbarton Oaks. Under the Proposals, the Security Council was to assume primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. While members of the proposed organization were to undertake to settle their disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the use or threat of force, they were to assume no obligation to take enforcement action until the Security Council had taken a decision to that effect. While no agreement on Security Council voting procedure was reached at Dumbarton Oaks, it was assumed, and later agreed at Yalta, that for enforcement measures, at least, agreement of the Great Powers, that is, the permanent members of the Council, would be necessary. The propriety of regional arrangements for the maintenance of international peace and security was expressly recognized. In fact, the Security Council was to encourage the settlement of local disputes by regional means and to use, where appropriate, regional arrangements for enforcement action as well. However, it was expressly provided that no enforcement action was to be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council. Furthermore, the Security Council was to be informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements.

The requirement of Security Council authorization for enforcement action under regional arrangements aroused particularly strong opposition in Latin American countries. With this position there was considerable sympathy in the United States. On the assumption, certainly warranted, that agreement of all the permanent members of the Security Council was necessary to such authorization, it would have become possible for a permanent member outside the Western Hemisphere to prevent any action from being taken under mutual defense arrangements between the American republics such as were provided for in the Act of Chapultepec of March 1945. To make possible the development of a Western Hemisphere security system within the framework of the United Nations, the American republics, including the United States, were anxious to obtain a modification of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals which would eliminate the possibility of veto by a permanent member, outside the hemisphere, of action under a regional security arrangement. In line with the French position after World War I, there were also those who desired to safeguard the right of the states immediately concerned to take action in case of a revival of aggression by the Axis Powers without having to wait for Security Council authorization. The issue of regionalism thus became one of the knottiest questions with which the San Francisco Conference had to deal.

Three significant changes were made in the Dumbarton Oaks text. These will be considered in the inverse order of their importance. First, a provision was inserted stressing the desirability of using regional agencies and arrangements for the pacific settlement of disputes. This represented only a change of emphasis. Second, the requirement of Security Council authorization for enforcement action under regional arrangements was waived in the case of measures taken against an enemy state under Article 107 of the Charter or under "regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy" by any such state. This provision was apparently introduced largely on the insistence of France and the Soviet Union. Third, by the terms of what became Article 51 of the Charter, "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations" was safeguarded. This provided the undisputable legal basis for the use of force, by a single member or

by a group of members, in case of an armed attack, without any requirement of Security Council authorization.

The effect and intent of this Article were to exempt from Security Council control the operation of Western Hemisphere security arrangements, such as were provided for and anticipated in the Act of Chapultepec. The effect (we are less sure here regarding the intent) certainly was to open the door to all limited arrangements that might be considered necessary by particular groups of states to meet the danger of armed attack. The only Charter limitation placed upon the right of members to enter into such arrangements and take action under them is the obligation (1) to inform the Council of measures taken or in contemplation, and (2) to terminate such action once the Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. It is not made clear who decides whether necessary measures have been taken, and it is of course clear that a permanent member, if it should so desire, may prevent the Council from taking necessary measures and may also prevent any decision by the Council that "measures necessary to maintain international peace and security" have been taken.

In the report of the Secretary of State, as the chairman of the American delegation, on the results of the San Francisco Conference, it was stated that the provisions of the Charter on regional arrangements insured "the preservation of the inter-American system based on the Good Neighbor Policy . . . without establishing a precedent which might engender rivalry between regional groups at the expense of world security."² In the light of subsequent developments, it is difficult to agree with this conclusion.

In the practice of the United Nations with respect to the maintenance of peace and security, or perhaps one could better say in the conduct of members of the United Nations, the regional principle has found wide application. At the time the Charter entered into force, the trend in the direction of reliance upon regional or limited arrangements was well under way. The Pact of the Arab League was signed on March 22, 1944. The Act of Chapultepec, creating obligations of mutual assistance for the duration of the war, was adopted in March 1945. The Soviet Union had concluded treaties of mutual assistance with the United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, France, Yugoslavia, Poland and China. These latter agreements pro-

² Department of State Pub. 2349, Conf. Series 71, p. 108.

vided for the rendering of immediate military support by each contracting Power to the other in case of German aggression (in the case of China, Japanese aggression). The treaties with Poland and Yugoslavia extended this obligation to aggression by any state allied with Germany.

The entrance into force of the Charter and the establishment of the Security Council as a functioning organization, beginning in January 1946, did not reverse this trend. The Security Council had no sooner met than certain of the permanent members were engaged in making charges and countercharges against each other. The Security Council showed itself consistently incapable of taking decisions on important questions before it, because of the inability of the permanent members to agree. While they were able to agree upon the establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission and the directives under which it was to operate, once the Commission began its deliberations it became clear that the Anglo-American and Soviet views were incapable of reconciliation. This apparently irreconcilable conflict of interests and attitudes was further reflected in the inability of the Military Staff Committee to agree upon basic principles for the implementation of Article 43 of the Charter with the result that the Security Council was deprived not only of the will to act, but also of important means of action, even if it had been able to make up its mind. It was in this atmosphere of distrust and disagreement, further poisoned by unilateral acts which were interpreted by those against whom they were directed as aggressive in purpose, even though their authors professed to regard them as defensive and within the spirit of the Charter, that the trend toward regional security arrangements became further accentuated. In other words, in actual operation, the United Nations, far from being able to check the regional trend and build up confidence in global arrangements, has provided added reasons for seeking peace and security through regional arrangements. What is particularly to be noted is that, contrary to the practice during the period of the League, the regional arrangements or special agreements now being entered into are directed, not primarily against former enemies, but against former allies. This clearly shows the extent of the disintegration, or, perhaps better, absence of realization, of the unity of the major Powers which was so naïvely (it would seem) accepted as the solid base of the United Nations.

The extent of the trend toward regionalism in security arrangements during the past three years is indicated by a cursory review of the more important developments during this period. In Eastern Europe, in addition to its agreements with Poland and Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union has concluded mutual assistance agreements with Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland. Also the Communist-controlled governments of the Eastern European states have concluded similar agreements with each other, thus producing the effect of one multipartite regional arrangement. These agreements vary considerably in phraseology but provide generally for mutual aid in case of aggression. The treaty between Poland and Yugoslavia provides that, in the event one of the parties "should, as a result of aggression, be involved in war activities against Germany, or against a state which was allied with Germany in the past war or against any other state which would ally itself directly or in any form with Germany or with her ally in such aggression," each contracting party "will immediately give the other military and other aid and support by all means at its disposal." The treaties concluded since the Charter entered into force, even when the parties are not members of the United Nations, contain provisions obligating the parties to act in accordance with the principles (or spirit, in the case of nonmembers) of the Charter. The scope and intensity of Eastern European regionalism have been further accentuated by the establishment, by agreement of the Communist parties in the autumn of 1947, of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) and by efforts to achieve greater integration of the economies of participating states.

In Western Europe, encouraged by the assurance of American economic assistance and the likelihood that military aid as well would be forthcoming, the United Kingdom, France and the Benelux countries concluded on March 18, 1948 a treaty of collective military aid and economic and social coöperation under the terms of which the contracting parties agree that, should any one of them be "the object of an armed attack in Europe," they will afford the party so attacked "all the military and other aid and assistance in their power." It is expressly provided that the provisions of this agreement shall be carried out in accordance with obligations under Article 51 and other provisions of the Charter.

By its resolution of June 11, 1948, the United States Senate expressed its approval of the "association of the United States ... with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security." Encouraged by this statement of the Senate's position, the State Department initiated negotiations in July 1948 with the signatories of the Brussels Pact and Canada with a view to the conclusion of a North Atlantic defense agreement. These negotiations were subsequently expanded and eventuated in the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, Article 5 of which provides that each of the signatories, in the case of armed attack upon one of them, will assist the party so attacked "by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."

In the Western Hemisphere, the peacetime regional security arrangement, envisaged in the Act of Chapultepec, was at last brought to fruition in the Inter-American Treaty of Mutual Assistance, signed at Rio de Janeiro, September 2, 1947.³ Under the terms of the agreement, an armed attack against any one of the American states is to be met by concerted action on the part of all the American states. In the case of a threat to the peace, or aggression which does not take the form of an armed attack, the signatories agree to consult on measures to be taken. The Treaty expressly provides that none of its provisions shall be construed as impairing the rights and obligations of signatories under the Charter. The principles of the agreement were subsequently incorporated into the Charter of the Organization of American States. Though Canada has not become a party to the inter-American security system, its agreements with the United States make it a party to regional arrangements for the defense of the Western Hemisphere.

Though the regional arrangements above described have been the product of feelings of insecurity resulting from post-war tensions and the failure of the United Nations security system to materialize, and though these arrangements are justified under the terms of the Charter and expressly recognize the principles and provisions of the Charter, they have not generally met with approval by all members of the United Nations.

³ For text, see Department of State, *Bulletin*, vol. XVII, pp. 565-67.

We witness for example this general condition: The North Atlantic Pact is regarded by the Soviet Union as aggressive. The agreements entered into between the Soviet Union and the other satellite states are regarded by us as aggressive. I am not concerned here with who is right and who is wrong. It is just a statement of what the factual situation is.

In the light of past experience, it is not possible to define the appropriate rôle of regionalism in international organization by a sweeping generalization. There are certainly many considerations which favor the regional approach. National interests, particularly security, tend to be related to geographical location even in this age of rapid communication. The interests—strategic, economic, social and even cultural—which a state has in adjacent or easily accessible areas tend naturally to be more vital and real than interests in areas farther removed, and therefore provide a firmer base for organized international coöperation. Furthermore, likewise because of the importance of the geographical factor, the ability of a state to exercise its military power and political influence effectively is less in areas far removed or difficult of access than in areas nearer at hand. Also, national policies are likely to have developed along regional lines, and therefore national participation in regional organizations may create fewer internal political difficulties than participation in universal arrangements. Furthermore, regional agencies may be more effective than universal agencies in achieving their purposes because of the greater community of interests underlying them, the more effective participation of members, and the more limited and manageable scope of problems with which these agencies are called upon to deal.

On the other hand, certain considerations point to the need of caution in adopting the regional approach. Clearly the regional approach to a problem that is universal in scope, or at least concerns a larger area than the region proposed, is less than satisfactory and may have positively harmful results if it encourages the development of rival groupings or results in the serious disturbance of normal relationships. It may become necessary for emergency reasons but must clearly be regarded as in the nature of the lesser of two evils. Also regional groupings directed against outside states or which are capable of being so interpreted, while they may appear to have some justification in terms of the national interests of the participat-

ing members, are not likely to contribute to the permanent organization of international peace and security, except on the assumptions (1) that independent and competing Power groupings, if the proper equilibrium is established, will of themselves, by checking the ambitions and excesses of each other, assure the maintenance of peace, or (2) that it is possible to maintain permanently or at least for a long period of time the power superiority and will to use it of a limited group or alliance of states thought to have a desire for peace not shared by certain states outside the group.

In the light of past experience, the regional approach would appear particularly well suited to the performance of such emergency functions as the economic reconstruction of areas whose economies have been severely weakened by war or other disaster, and the resettlement of peoples uprooted by similar causes. The regional approach would also appear well adapted to the performance of such long-range functions as the development of backward areas, the handling of health problems peculiar to certain parts of the world, the development of some great natural resource such as the water power of the Alps or the Danube River valley, the organization of inland transport, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and even the organization of collective force to keep the peace, so long as the regional group is concerned with the conduct of its own members.

The inadequacy of regionalism becomes apparent when it is used as the basis for dealing with problems that are essentially world-wide in character, or when the activities of the regional group seem to impinge upon and seriously threaten the interests of other states. Regional security arrangements which are clearly directed against other members of a world security organization are particularly open to this objection. They not only reflect a lack of basic confidence in the good faith of these members but they encourage the organization of counter-groups. Thus they increase tension within the world organization, lead to bloc voting on important political questions—and many questions not normally political tend to assume that character—and weaken the effectiveness of the organization as an instrument of peaceful adjustment and compromise.

It must be recognized, however, that when conditions have deteriorated to the point that they have reached within the United Nations, when the world security organization has,

for all practical purposes, ceased to exist or failed to become effective as the result of the disintegration, or, perhaps better, the absence, of Great-Power unity, substitutes may have to be found, at least temporarily. The question then to be decided is what course is most likely to provide security while at the same time not placing unnecessary obstacles in the way of the rehabilitation of the global system. It must be clearly recognized, however, that the world organization is not being strengthened by the multiplication and tightening of these regional security arrangements. That, it seems to me, would be the lesson of the League experience. On the most optimistic view they can only be justified as temporary expedients and as possible aids in creating conditions which permit the rehabilitation of the global system.

In conclusion, and more directly with relation to the North Atlantic Pact, it would seem to me that the Pact can conceivably be justified as the most effective means of providing national security under present conditions. I am not going to state what my feelings are on that particular point; but I do feel very strongly that it is not possible to justify the North Atlantic Pact as a means of strengthening the United Nations. The whole idea of such a limited regional security arrangement runs directly counter to the basic philosophy of any worldwide security organization.

REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN

CHAIRMAN KROUT: Thank you, Professor Goodrich, for your very clear interpretation of regional understandings in the light of the terms of the Charter of the United Nations.

It is usually a salutary thing—at least so Robert Burns reminded mankind a long time ago—"to see ourselves as others see us." Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupé has agreed that he will try to help us look at United States foreign policy through the eyes of European observers. He is well qualified to do this for us, as he is an Austrian by birth and knows the European scene. Indeed, he spent all of last summer on a visit once again to Western Europe.

In 1945 he published an impressive study of power and foreign policy in the United States, which he called *The Balance of Tomorrow*. His continuing and lively interest in the subject of power politics is presently attested by his work in the Department of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupé!

EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

ROBERT STRAUZ-HUPÉ

Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania

TO generalize on European attitudes toward American foreign policy is to generalize on European attitudes toward virtually every important issue of our times; for American foreign policy holds the key to war and peace in Europe, and thus to the survival of European civilization. It is by the barometer of Washington that Europeans read the pressure of their internal politics and of the forces converging upon them from the Soviet East.

The primary facts of the European post-war scene are the presence of the Soviet Union in the heart of the continent and the massive intervention of the United States in the most intimate affairs of a score of European states, an intervention prompted by the enfeeblement of the European economy as well as by reflexes to the westward advance of Soviet military power and political influence. Though the degree of the tensions imposed upon the political and social structure of Europe by this confrontation upon the European stage of two enormous extra-European Powers is unprecedented, the situation has been building up for a long time. It was predictable on the basis of observable trends originating in the nineteenth century, and *was*, indeed, predicted before the end of that century by not a few European thinkers from de Tocqueville to Nietzsche.

Up to World War I European attitudes toward the United States fell under two categories, those of the Great Powers and those of the small or emerging nation states of Eastern Europe, to wit, those of the *beati possidentes* and those of the underdogs. The former, including Britain, France, Russia, Spain and, after 1871, Germany, viewed the United States as a Power in the traditional sense, assuming its place in the world balance of power, yet centering its aspirations upon the Western Hemisphere and the Pacific Ocean. By contrast, the struggling

nations and nationalities of Eastern Europe viewed the United States as a force transcending, and impinging upon, the exclusive circle of the Concert of Powers, as the safe refuge of the persecuted, as the citadel of freedom, as the epitome of statecraft, and as the youthful, rough-shod guardian of truths nearest to the secular utopias of progress.

The turning point is 1917. With America's entry into World War I, that conflict, which had begun as a contest over the balance of power, turned into an ideological war. In European eyes, the attributes of United States foreign policy became fixed in the concepts of national self-determination and of a universal order under law. New spatial realities opened up before Europe: American participation in the struggle and in the subsequent peace settlement and economic reconstruction widened the meaning of Western culture. This widening of the Western horizon coincided with the withdrawal of Russia into the seclusion of an orientalized experiment. Thus the accident of history, or the dialectic of process, if that notion is more pleasing, traced the outline of a western association in the very image of Canning's famous epigram. However, American political and economic contributions to the reconstruction of Europe, and the attraction exercised upon the European masses by the ideals as well as gadgets of the American way of life, did not appear to all Europeans as an unmixed blessing. The 'twenties echoed increasingly vehement protests against tendencies lumped somewhat loosely under the term "Americanization". Not a few members of the ruling and intellectual classes deplored the social and cultural changes wrought by the impact upon European folkways of the automobile, the movies and mass-produced goods in general. Since no one can state plausibly that these things were specifically American importations, the case narrows down to a question of quality. Americanization was a preference, a preference for Fords over Citroens, for the glossy product of Hollywood over the jerky domestic films, for action-packed Hemingway over introverted Proust. Thus the protest against Americanization was largely, though not entirely, a protest against American competition and against social trends inherent in Europe's own development. The record of European reactions to the Marshall Plan and Atlantic Pact should be read together with the literary record of Europe's reactions after World War I to the phenomenon

of Americanization, real or imagined, lest long-standing preconceptions be mistaken for new and spontaneous tendencies. When *Le Monde*, in July 1948, somberly reviews the consequences flowing from the Marshall Plan, views with alarm the danger of United States economic and political domination of France in general and of the French press in particular, and warns its readers obliquely against American penetration in the form of Walter Lippmann's column reproduced in the *Figaro*, the line of thought is not exactly new. This is not to say, however, that the cultural protest against American ascendancy can be set aside as the mere expression of ill-humor sweetened by nostalgia. That protest, though the avowed target is America, reveals deep anxiety over the decline of Europe's cultural vitality, and over the self-wrought disintegration of European society.

Since this hostile response to American cultural influences is characteristic of comparatively small European intellectual circles and may reflect a temporary rather than a lasting sense of inferiority induced by the ravages of war, it may be less important than would appear from its literary verve and occasional vehemence. More basic to European attitudes toward United States foreign policy are certain features of that policy itself which have puzzled and disquieted Europeans for a good many years. The most important among these are emphasis on principles in theory and primacy of economics in practice. There is in the stated foreign policies of European Powers no counterpart for the Fourteen Points and Four Principles of Woodrow Wilson, or the Twelve Points of Mr. Truman's Madison Square Garden speech on foreign policy in 1945. No responsible European statesman has pronounced himself on the incipient demise of power politics as categorically as did Mr. Hull in 1943, nor has any European foreign minister declared that "there will no longer be the need for spheres of influence, for balance of power...."

If Europeans find it difficult to reconcile the declaratory foreign policy of the United States with what the United States actually does or fails to do, this does not necessarily reflect European obtuseness or cynicism. When, for example, the United States obtained unilateral control of formerly Japanese-mandated islands in the Pacific, not a few Europeans viewed American action as inspired by strategic considerations rather

than devotion to the trusteeship principle written into the U.N. Charter. Subsequent United States policy statements on dependent and backward areas struck such peoples, as, for example, the British and the Dutch, as somewhat contradictory and confusing. Not that Europeans are inclined to censure American procedure in the Pacific! No European naval Power would have relinquished bases acquired under similar circumstances. Their bewilderment is due not to the action of the United States but to the evocation by the United States before and after that particular episode of general principles which should govern international conduct toward "dependent" and "backward" areas. Similarly, the European press and the records of European parliaments reveal considerable complacency toward such questions as to whether the Atlantic Pact can or cannot be squared with the U.N. Charter. The persistent efforts of American officials and political leaders to deduce legal sanction from the letter of the U.N. Charter for political and military alliances directed against the Soviet Union impress European public opinion as earnest but slightly labored attempts to justify verbally policies which are plainly called for by the logic of the situation, if perhaps not by the intent of the Charter.

No less perplexing for Europeans probing the true nature of American foreign policy is the priority it gives to economic measures and objectives. American generosity is the single most important source of Europe's good will; it draws to the United States the gratitude and sympathy of all classes and of a surprisingly large number of followers of those parties which are ranged most uncompromisingly against United States foreign policy. The European of the twentieth century, however, has rediscovered through ghastly object lessons a timeless truth: the stomach alone does not make history. It may be a cliché to say that the continental European is ideologically-minded whereas the American is not; but not every cliché is useless. After World War II, Europeans—if they ever put their trust in the desirability of the Soviet-United States wartime compromise—perceived quickly the widening ideological rift between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the United States optimism concerning East-West relations lingered on long after the cracks in the new world order had appeared. It is this time lag, too, which explains why the American public centered its

attention for several months after the Congressional debate on the Marshall Plan upon the anticipated benefits Europe would derive from American economic aid. By contrast, in that same period, European debate turned to the political and military measures which were palpably needed to implement the American economic offensive in the cold war.

A breakdown of European attitudes toward the United States according to political parties reveals the not-so-surprising fact that the Communist parties are uniformly hostile. In France and Italy, however, where the party has sought to enlist mass support rather than pare down its following to hard cores of militancy, some wavering among the rank and file may be ascribed to American economic aid, the effects of which have just begun to percolate to the poorer classes. But it is the well-nigh universal weariness of war which replenishes the ranks of the Communist parties and gains them allies. It is no accident that communism has managed to capture or infiltrate almost every pacifist movement in Europe. Only by closing one's eyes to the obvious risks of a positive policy is it possible to present United States intervention in Europe as a guarantee of peace under all circumstances. United States foreign policy is nothing of the kind, and if the next few years were not a critical phase in world history, neither United States rearmament nor the Atlantic Pact would be needed. American policy *does* aim at deterring the would-be aggressor and at raising the odds in favor of America's allies should the aggressor strike. But this does not exclude altogether the possibility that Europe will have to fight. The only safe alternative to this admitted risk is complete nonresistance—which in the case of Europe means surrender to the Soviet Union on its own terms. Indeed, many Europeans, especially in Italy and France, and not all of them are Communists, do not believe that they have a major stake in meeting the aggression of the Soviet Union. They consider United States foreign policy as inimical to Europe, and, though that sentiment may be couched in such elevated language as, for example, existentialism, to their personal safety.

In the last resort, the most difficult questions United States policy faces in Europe are: what are men willing to fight for, and will they fight at all? On the answers to these questions hinges the success or failure of the Atlantic Pact. They cannot be answered now with any degree of conviction except for

Britain. That they cannot be answered affirmatively to our liking for any other European country is the trump card in the hand of the Communist party in its fight against United States policy in Europe.

Though partisans of the extreme Right in Europe now applaud American foreign policy, their sympathies may not be as enduring as the warmth of their avowals indicates. Traditionally, the parties of the extreme Right on the continent are anti-American as well as anti-British, for they have always been opposed to representative government based on universal suffrage, to the balance of power as an obstacle to continental nationalist ambitions, and to federal, decentralized forms of government. It is well worth noting the genealogical descent of rightist doctrine, especially in Germany and Italy where the common danger of communism and Soviet expansionism have made the extreme Right the ally of the United States. More important still, the extreme Right has always been, and always will be, opposed to the unification of Europe, save on terms intolerable to any European country except its own.

The natural allies in Europe of the United States are the middle groups, notably the Socialists and Christian Democrats. The Socialists, Marxist in theory and anti-Marxist in practice, and the Christian Democrats, liberal though not necessarily democratic, are the parties of government, singly or jointly in every West European country, including Germany west of the Iron Curtain, but excluding the Iberian Peninsula. Because they are the parties of government, their fortunes are tied to the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Pact; they are, for better or for worse, the partners of the United States and their tenure in office depends directly on the success of United States foreign policy. Though both parties can rely on the following of a substantial sector of the working population and control powerful trade unions, they must look to the middle classes and the farmers for the critical margin of support.

Since, in relation to 1930, the center of gravity of European politics has shifted far to the left, the term "middle classes" does not mean what it means in the United States. The political center of gravity of the middle classes can be described as lying at a point half-way between Christian Democrats and Socialists, which point corresponds roughly to the position of the Right wing of the Labour party in Britain and to a point

well to the left-of-center of the New Deal Democrats. While these analogies are susceptible to considerable refinement, they may serve as a rough-and-ready guide to European politics. European politics are concerned principally with various alternatives of public control rather than with the alternative between public and private control of the national economy. It follows that the European middle parties, because they are gradualist, anti-revolutionary, anti-communist, anti-fascist, and bourgeois—that is, bourgeois in the meaning of the term as it applies to contemporary Europe—are agreed more closely with the political philosophy of the incumbent administration in the United States than are the other political parties. Their hopes are the same, namely gradual social improvement and economic stability; so are their fears: an economic crash in the United States and consequent withdrawal of the United States from foreign commitments.

It is necessary here to clarify an issue which seems to have given rise to considerable misunderstanding in the United States: The bulk of de Gaullist following in France is drawn from the middle and working classes and the program of the R.P.F. is, by American standards, liberal—with a small “l”—and socially progressive, to say the least. Though de Gaulle has urged for France a course more independent of the United States, notably as regards a German settlement, he has endorsed United States over-all objectives in Europe more forthrightly than any other French political leader. De Gaulle, no less than Socialists and M.R.P.—Christian Democrats—is a fervent partisan of West European Union.

A breakdown, along occupational groups, of European attitudes toward the United States reveals the following alignments: the strongest support is given to United States policy by the middle classes, which represent an amalgam of bourgeoisie in the traditional sense, functionaries, conservative labor, and the bulk of the intellectuals, the military profession, and the churches. Europe's residual big capitalists are pro-American—as long as they deem their position as not endangered by American competition. Perhaps the strongest antagonism toward the United States is found in certain sectors of European peasantry, and it is not an accident that in France, for example, the Communists succeeded in building up a following in some of the richest farming regions; for the European

peasant is least ready to accept and approve of the values of American civilization, least capable of understanding the drives of American foreign policy, and least affected by the beneficial consequences of American economic aid. As for the last, it impairs his commanding position in a sellers' market of agricultural commodities. The greatest and most neglected task before United States propaganda is to win over that most distrustful, least communicative, and least understand European: the European peasant.

European labor, as has been alluded to above, is not as monolithic and unsophisticated as Communist propaganda has made it out to be. Thanks to three generations of Marxist indoctrination and intra-Marxist controversy, it is ideologically nimble and capable of distinguishing between several kinds of socialism and the Stalinist variant. As labor's purchasing power increases and the aid of the United States in terms of goods for peacetime use as well as weapons succeeds in strengthening public power, Communist control over labor will meet its first real post-war test.

The attitudes of political parties and social classes are to no small measure conditioned by the national strategic point of view. It is glibly asserted by some commentators on European reactions to the American debate on the Atlantic Pact that "Europeans do not understand American constitutional procedure." Europeans are not unaware of the fact that only Congress can declare war and that the Executive cannot pledge the United States to go to war. They also know that the Executive can, and has, committed the United States to policies no less positive and unambiguous than those pursued by European governments, and that the discretionary powers of the President are enormous. Hence, whatever misunderstanding there is in Europe concerns not so much "constitutional procedure" but the manner in which the American electorate makes up its mind. On that score maritime peoples like the British, Dutch, Norwegians and Danes have shown a high degree of intuitive comprehension: the limiting provisions of the American constitution notwithstanding, the Norwegians and the Danes were quick to join the Atlantic Pact. By contrast, Europe's territorially-minded nations are more inclined to seek hard and fast, formally binding commitments, and grope for the concrete aims of United States foreign policy, concretely put

not only in general statements of intentions but also in terms of offensive military strength. This attitude is characteristic of France and Germany and, though it is camouflaged by the doctrine of neutrality, of Sweden. It is the attitude of those who, as the saying goes, believe that Europe can stand a Third World War but not another liberation.

Among European nations, the Mediterranean states feel strategically most neglected. They suspect, and that suspicion is not entirely baseless, that Americans hold in low esteem the staying powers of the Mediterranean races. They derive substance for their fears from the slowness with which the United States approaches the incorporation of Turkey and Spain into the Atlantic Pact, though both are cornerstones in the defense of Europe, and from the inconclusiveness of American support to Greece. Spain, because of the unlovely figure of General Franco, is a special case. Not a few Frenchmen and Italians of the Right profess to view American policy toward Spain as motivated rather by anti-Latin bias than by ideological considerations; by contrast the French and Italian Left and British labor approve of American resistance to the seductive attraction of Spanish air bases.

On no other topic reigns confusion more supreme than on American strategic concepts. For that Europeans are not solely to blame, since in the United States the circumlocutions of Congressional debate and the rivalry of the armed services have not been conducive to supplying a clear answer to the question: what kind of war and where does the United States propose to fight the Soviet Union, if and when the *casus foederis* of the Atlantic Pact is called into operation? This immensely complicated question concerns the old land Powers of Europe most vitally and is closely bound up with the ultimate objective of American political strategy. Is that strategy to be literally understood as one of "containment" and, if so, where precisely does the United States propose to contain Soviet power? The answer to the latter question has not been made easier for Europeans by American policy in China which, since most Europeans fail to grasp the finer distinctions between Mao Tse-tung's agrarian communism and the genuine Moscow product, has provoked considerable consternation in many European quarters. As to the question of the efficacy of containment as such, it revolves around the *status quo* in Eastern Europe. In Poland,

linked to the United States by millions of Americans of Polish descent and the memory of Polish heroes enshrined in the hall of revolutionary fame, in Czechoslovakia, the nation that Woodrow Wilson "made", in Yugoslavia and Albania whom the United States in the critical 1918-1920 period supported against Italy, in the Baltic states whose conquest by the Soviet Union the United States, as the world's only important Power, has steadfastly refused to recognize, in Finland, Austria, Rumania and Hungary, the United States possesses an enormous reservoir of good will and an immensely effective lever against Soviet power. That lack of United States offensive action may result, in another few years, in draining that reservoir into apathy is highly probable, giving due weight to Communist practices of liquidation and indoctrination. This consideration alone, leaving aside calculations of a strategic nature such as the relative growth of the Soviet war potential, suffices to explain why the scope and limitations of a policy of "containment" are the bare bones of the European dilemma. That dilemma can be phrased differently as follows. What kind of Europe does the United States want: a Europe free and united, or a Europe divided along the Elbe-Saale-Enns line, half free and half Sovietized?

Europe is surfeited with ideologies. The United States cannot expeditiously launch, as some cheerful publicity experts of psychological warfare suggest, an ideology which will appeal to Europeans and win them over to the American way of life and away from the Communist design for living, a counter-ideology, so to speak. What the United States *can* do is to put its weight behind an idea that need not be improvised because it has already captured the imagination of the European peoples.

It bespeaks the sagacity and courage of Winston Churchill that he has held fast to the concept of a united Europe that *is* Europe, and that he has not fallen into the trap of a union of a *part* of Europe, to wit Western Europe, as the ultimate goal of European striving. It is not proposed to enter here into a discussion of the merits or demerits of European Union, but there can be no question that any European, no matter how much or how little faith he places in the likelihood of European unification, conceives of the present line of division as a provisional and intolerable condition, permanently fraught with the danger of war. The test case of American foreign policy as regards

the ultimate shape of a European settlement is American policy in Germany. For better or for worse, American determination to create a West German state is in the eyes of Europe a token of American determination to yield no longer to Soviet pressure. The rising prosperity of that state and its integration into the proposed Western Union cannot but challenge the validity of the *status quo* to the east of the Elbe-Saale-Enns line. By the same token, a change of American policy in the direction of compromise, that is, resumption of four-Power discussion on the German settlement, will be viewed as tantamount to a retreat of the United States to a defensive position in Europe; if not incipient American withdrawal from the western reaches of the Eurasian continent. It will be the decision of the United States to stand and to meet the challenge at Europe's most critical frontier or to accept the Soviet thesis on Germany which will harden European attitudes toward American foreign policy in the twentieth century.

REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN

CHAIRMAN KROUT: We are deeply indebted to you, sir, for that picture of European attitudes toward American foreign policy. However we may react to the picture, certainly none of us can deny the fact that its colors are vivid. It will bear rather prolonged contemplation.

There is a close association between the concept of an Atlantic Community and the problem of Germany and its rôle in European economic recovery. There are few persons who can guide us so skillfully through the intricacies of that situation as Charles F. Kindleberger.

We feel at Columbia that we have a special claim on him, because some twelve years ago he took his doctor's degree in Economics in the Faculty of Political Science. Since that time he has had a distinguished career, in the Office of Strategic Services, as Intelligence Officer with the Twelfth Army Group, as Chief of the Division of Austrian-German Economic Affairs in the Department of State.

I am very happy to introduce to you Professor Charles P. Kindleberger, now Associate Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

GERMANY AND THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY OF EUROPE

CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER

Associate Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

AMERICAN interest in and concern for the economic recovery of Germany rest on four strands in the web of American foreign policy. Recovery is first a requirement of the development of German democracy in turn needed for peace in Europe; second, a weapon against the Soviet Union, whether in competing for the favor of the Germans or in inducing the Russians to agree to a German settlement; third, a contribution to the recovery of Western Europe and to the political stability of the Atlantic Community; and, finally, a means of reducing the burden on the American taxpayer.

Desirable on these four grounds, economic recovery is a prime objective of foreign policy. Awkwardly, however, the type of policy suited to accord with one aim may not equally fit another. My task today, as I understand it, is to indicate the areas of conflict, the alternatives they pose and the considerations which may guide American choices. To narrow the task, major emphasis will be put on the second and third aims: recovery in Germany as a weapon in the cold war waged against us by the Soviet Union and recovery as a contribution to the stability of Western Europe within the orbit of the Atlantic society of nations.

Recovery in Germany

From all points of view, however, German recovery thus far has been useful and welcome. This recovery, as you probably know, has partaken of the nature of a miracle. Steel production has doubled in a year; coal output has increased by 50 per cent over the same period; industrial production as a whole has risen from 50 per cent of the 1936 average in June 1948 to 80 per cent in February 1949. Farm output has increased somewhat, and crop collections, though still unsatisfactory, more. The most impressive improvement is perhaps in exports,

and within their total, in exports other than coal. Total exports have risen from approximately \$160 millions in 1946 to \$750 millions in 1948. At the end of the year they were going forward at the rate of \$850 millions annually. Exports other than coal amounted to something on the order of \$40 millions in 1946. They are currently approaching that figure monthly.

Is this miracle a fact? For the most part, it is. There was serious underreporting in the official statistics prior to the monetary reform of last June. Some part of the recovery represents simply a shift of illicit production into the official figures. In exports, moreover, the final success of the Army in liquidating the "deficit" of \$362 millions that developed from the cashing of local currencies by American troops in Germany, Austria and Japan¹ has diverted a stream of dollar services formerly produced by Germany for the Department of the Army as occupation costs into the category of exports. For the most part, however, the miracle is real.

What has caused the miracle? The answer to this question is a little more complex. It is hard from this distance to give exact weights to the factors involved; but they are, roughly in the order of their importance: the monetary reform of June 20, 1948; the Berlin blockade; United States assistance to the Bizone beyond the disease-and-unrest formula; and increasing German responsibility for the Bizonal economy combined with increasing German unity and purposefulness, not to say nationalism. The monetary reform is occasionally given all the credit. There can be no doubt it was of great importance. The exchange of 100 Reichsmarks for 6½ Deutsche marks, of which the ½ mark was blocked, restored the value of money and in so doing reduced absenteeism among employed workers, ended the shortage of employables who previously either did not need money or were more profitably employed in sniping cigarette butts, and ended hoarding of goods by farmers, merchants and factory managers. The partial restoration of the price system as the arbiter of production and distribution alternatives, moreover, has liberated the Allied and German bureaucracy from the burden of making all economic decisions, and the administrative labor of Sisyphus of ensuring that these decisions are carried out. The signal success of the monetary

¹ *New York Times*, January 5, 1949.

reform was in part a function of the long period of monetary disorder which preceded it. Large-scale dishoarding took place in a brief period, because hoarding had been going on over three years. By delaying the monetary reform through continuously holding out a ray of hope for its quadripartite imposition on a unified Germany, the Soviet Union ironically made a significant contribution to its ultimate success.

But the contribution of the U.S.S.R. to the economic recovery of Germany was not limited to this delay. Monetary skirmishes and counterattacks in Berlin ultimately evoked the blockade of that city. The coal, steel, machinery and other supplies which the Russians kept out of Berlin made an important contribution to the recovery of the Bizone area. Some significant part of the cost is being borne by the United States and Britain in the airlift; another is carried by the Berliners who have to economize food and fuel, as well as suffer unemployment for lack of materials. Eastern Germany, however, and through it the Soviet Union, are also paying a large share of the cost; and the Bizone benefits.

It is not generally recognized that the status of Berlin was probably the crucial factor in determining whether Eastern Germany, through 1947, was an asset or a liability to the Soviet Union. In 1946, for example, the American responsibility for the western sectors of Berlin, direct and indirect, probably added \$150 millions to our bill and freed resources in Eastern Germany supplying roughly the same value in current reparations to the Soviet Union. If Berlin had been provisioned from the surrounding countryside, as the Western Allies originally implicitly assumed, Western occupation costs and Soviet occupation benefits would both have been significantly lower. The curious system of supply adopted for Berlin, however, made possible the blockade, required the expensive airlift, but, in combination with the monetary reform, gave a significant impetus to the Bizonal recovery.

Has the miracle of German recovery been completed? The answer here is no. Production has some distance to increase to reach present capacity limits, and present capacity must be expanded. The bottlenecks of coal, transportation and steel have been negotiated to bring the economy before a bottleneck in electric power production. After all particular bottlenecks have been broken, there remains the task of achieving an over-

all increase in productivity which is still, in the coal mines, for example, only 65 per cent of pre-war productivity. Exports are far from sufficient to produce a balance in the German accounts. While the monetary reform has worked wonders in restoring the price system, smuggling goes forward on a large scale, estimated at \$200 millions a year, crop collections are below appropriate levels, and some hoarding possibly continues in the industrial sector of the economy.

German recovery today is at the crossroads. The four-year program submitted by the Bizonal authorities to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation shows the direction chosen. It may be worth while to examine certain aspects of that program.

The German Four-Year Program

The four-year program of the Bizone, to my mind, raises in acute form certain economic, social and political questions for the United States. Let me explain what I have in mind in terms of the long-run investment program.

The German program calls for gross investment amounting to 20 per cent of gross national product during the period of the European Recovery Program, and expects to arrive in 1952-53, after the completion of the aid, at an annual rate of 22.7 per cent. These figures are high. In 1936, when Germany both enjoyed a higher per capita level of income and was operating under a system of suppressed inflation, gross investment ran 20.5 per cent of gross national product. In the United States, a far richer country, the present total of gross private domestic investment and net foreign investment runs below 20 per cent of gross national product during prosperity. In 1929, for example, it was 16 per cent. Except for Sweden, the projected German rate is the highest in Europe. The impressive or appalling fact, however, is that an attempt will be made to achieve this rate of investment with orthodox fiscal policy. I submit that this will require the adoption of policies which will be harmful to our first objective of building a solid base for political democracy in Germany.

The present rate of personal savings in Germany is close to zero. In order to get savings to the level necessary to sustain a rate of gross investment of 20 per cent of gross national product, the Bizonal authorities plan to maintain high interest rates,

to encourage business to withhold earnings (through a tax on dividends), and, if necessary, to raise collective investment through increased taxes and forced loans.

There is something admirable in this Spartan austerity. It may be doubted, however, whether it will succeed and whether it may not produce undesirable consequences in the vain attempt. It seems likely that the attempt to produce the savings through high interest rates will produce unemployment instead. There are already signs of this. In broader terms, orthodox financing leads to encouraging inequality of incomes to increase savings by upper-income groups. Keeping wages down and profits up is a social virtue; income taxes are bad because they restrict savings as well as consumption; and the best tax is the one which is most regressive in restricting consumption.

I may be regarded as laboring the point unduly. Where, however, I should like to know, is the *Lastungsausgleich* which was set out in the Colm-Dodge-Goldsmith report as an essential part of the monetary reform scheme? This measure, you will recall, was designed to equalize the burdens of war losses, by ensuring that holders of property should feel the weight of the reform as well as holders of currency and other forms of debt. The measure was provided for in the June ordinance; it was postponed until September, deferred then for one reason or another. It is now, according to Military Government sources, vetoed by the Department of State, although the newspaper account expresses the notion current in Germany that the real seat of opposition is in Military Government itself.² Provision for equalizing the burden of war losses among various groups in Germany is included in the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive to Germany. The reason underlying this is that the inflation of 1921-23 wiped out the burden of World War I in a most inequitable way, eliminating the middle class. This social effect probably had a large share of the responsibility, along with the unemployment of 1932, in Hitler's rise to power. For holders of real property again to escape their share in the burdens of the war will again weaken the German social and political structure.

The dilemma posed for our foreign policy is an acute one. The Germans want an investment program in order to achieve a long-run increase in their standard of living. We want an

² *New York Times*, February 4, 1949.

increase in their productivity, which requires an increase in investment because of the qualitative deterioration in their labor supply, to reach a balanced position in foreign trade. The major paths to a high level of investment, in the absence of a willingness on the part of the Germans to save, are inflation—which in its extreme forms is vicious in its effects on the distribution of income particularly in eliminating the middle class—or orthodox fiscal policy of an oppressive sort, which bears most heavily on the lowest income recipients. Both are politically unacceptable. Without the time to argue the point in detail, I submit that repressed inflation of a mild sort, which will maintain employment, divide necessities of life in an equitable fashion, avoid the pitfall of unemployment, and so on, is perhaps the most appropriate policy. For such a policy to succeed, however, I should think that the degree of investment contemplated would have to be reduced from its present fearsome height.

German Recovery in the Focus of Europe

Moving outward from the confines of the Bizone, we may contemplate the rôle of Germany in the economy of Europe in several lights. Germany used to be both a source of supply and a market for Europe, and I include both Eastern and Western Europe. At the same time Germany depended on Eastern and Western Europe as sources of imports and outlets for exports in important degree. Germany was a competitor of Western Europe in certain types of exports; a coöperator cartelwise in others. But most significant of all in a bilateral world, Germany normally derived foreign exchange from its export surplus within Europe to requite its deficit to overseas producers in the British Commonwealth and the Western Hemisphere. If the German economy is to be restored to good working order, some source of overseas exchange other than the disease-and-unrest appropriations of the Department of the Army must be found. The easiest place to find it will be in Western Europe, and this will be very difficult. But let us discuss these problems more systematically.

Much has been made of the fact that the Potsdam settlement and the *de facto* split down the Elbe has cut the Western industrial zones of Germany off from the grain and potato areas of the East. The political change by itself is of no consequence

to the economist. So long as no new trade barriers were erected, so long as production policy and efficiency in agriculture in the Soviet Zone of Germany and in the territories under Polish administration continued as before, and so long as other national policies were on balance neutral, trade could continue with the same benefits to both parties, without regard to flag. But new barriers to trade have been erected; and, more important, land reform has broken up the large estates in Pomerania, Mecklenburg, East Prussia, and even Hungary which produced grain and potatoes for export to Western Germany. New subsistence agriculture in these areas has increased German dependence on extensive agriculture overseas. The land reform necessary to win support for communism from the peasants in Eastern Europe is rapidly being followed by collectivization of agriculture, designed to free labor for industrial employment. This collectivization, however, is likely to go only far enough to supply workers for industry and not the entire distance necessary to reconstitute what were essentially "hunger exports". If exports from the area are forthcoming, Germany is likely to have first call on them. By and large, however, it appears unlikely that the pre-war basis for exchange between Western and Eastern Europe, or between even Western and Eastern Germany, will be reestablished. In consequence, Western Germany will remain more dependent on overseas supplies.

While Germany depends on Eastern Europe for its bread and potatoes, Western Europe needs Germany as a market for its butter and fresh fruits and vegetables. Many Danish, Dutch and Italian exports to Germany are in the semiluxury class, or can, like the services of the ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam, be foregone by a more expensive use of resources which economize scarce foreign exchange. The problem posed by the post-war necessity to resume old export outlets or find alternative sources of employment is a difficult one at best; its solution has not been assisted by the fact that, in the United States, assistance to countries which trade with Germany comes out of a different legislative pocket in the Congress than assistance for Germany.

The economics of the problem are simple. If Germany will not be able to afford semiluxuries after a period of transition, the resources engaged in producing them in Europe should be

shifted into other occupations. This shift may be made slowly if the resources are relatively immobile, or fast if they are mobile. If Germany eventually expects to consume the commodities, however, imports can be suspended if the resources engaged in their production are mobile. They can leave the production and eventually return to it. But in the case of resources which are not mobile, like the workers of Rotterdam or the lemon trees of Italy, imports must be continued through the period of stress, though the cost of supporting the immobile resources can appropriately be divided between the exporting and importing countries.

The politics of the problem, however, are far more difficult, particularly when they are reduced to differences of point of view and emphasis between sister departments of the same branch of the same government. My fellow economists and I are waiting for political science to develop a coherent theory of the administrative relations between in-post and out-post. This is part of the problem. Another part relates to the philosophic clash between the authority responsible for the part and that responsible for the whole. A final element may concern itself with individual personality. I take leave of these issues reluctantly, because they are fascinating. I regret, however, that I can contribute nothing to their solution.

We have been discussing Germany as a market. Let us reverse the coin and look at Germany as a supplier. There are a number of issues here. Their nature depends to some extent on whether the market can be described as belonging to the sellers, on the one hand, or to the buyers on the other. (Unhappily there appears to be no middle ground.) To illustrate the difference, let us look at coal. At one point during the war, there appears to have been in the United States government somewhere the idea that the way to handle the "German question" was to flood the coal mines of the Ruhr. This did not survive long. In July 1945, a directive was issued by the American and British governments to their Zone Commanders to export 25,000,000 tons of coal in seven months, regardless of the consequences to German industry. This target was not met; it was, of course, impossible to disregard the consequences. For the next two years, however, the recovery of Europe, held back for lack of coal, could gain only at the expense of the recovery of Germany, which also lacked coal. In the last

several months, coal has ceased to be the bottleneck retarding industrial production, either in Germany or in her customers. Coal exports from the United States are shrinking. Coal exports are regarded by Germany no longer as an evil enforced upon her by the victorious Allies, but as a useful source of earning power.

The volume of coal exports, however, is not the only problem. There are important questions of price. In the beginning, when there was no competition except from American coal, the price for Ruhr exports was arbitrarily set around \$9 or \$10 f. o. b. Duisburg per ton. American coal was being landed in Le Havre at a figure close to \$22. German coal was seriously undervalued at \$10 as became clear when Polish coal appearing on the market sold for \$15 at Polish ports and British coal, exported for the first time in 1948, was priced at \$16.

The price of German coal, however, was almost entirely an academic question. German imports were paid for largely by the United States, which was also helping to support a number of Germany's customers for coal. If the price had been raised, it might have earned more for the United States in Germany, but cost us more in other countries. The internal price of coal in Germany was in no way related to the foreign price, since there was no one exchange rate, and at the various rates used, the internal controlled price of RM 15 was in the neighborhood of \$4.50.

Under these circumstances, there has inevitably been a pull between those branches of the government concerned with making a record in Germany and those whose responsibilities run to the recovery of Europe as a whole. The first increase in the price of Ruhr coal to \$14 was put through in 1947. When British export appeared for the first time after the war in early 1948 with a still higher price—\$16 a ton—the occupation authorities in the Bizone wanted again to raise the price. This the Economic Cooperation Administration appears to have opposed. It is interesting first that the British should have set such a high price on their coal after this war, when a similar pricing policy after World War I was an important contributing factor to the decline of British coal exports to the continent; and second that the authorities in Germany should fight for an increase at the time when it became clear that the sellers' market was over. President Truman's decision in favor

of ECA over OMGUS appears to be to the long-run interest of the Ruhr as an exporter in a buyers' market, as well as of European importers. It is significant that this matter of price of coal should have to go to President Truman for a decision.

This raises the interesting question as to how the European coal market may be expected to function. The necessity to allocate in the Coal Committee of the Economic Commission for Europe has dwindled down to a few relatively scarce grades. The British and Polish industries are nationalized. The reasonable expectation is that the German industry will one day be state-owned, under the Ruhr authority, despite efforts being exerted in other directions. What is the likelihood for price and market competition in a market of three state traders? Even the staunchest supporter of open-pricing and multilateral trade must admit it is small. Germany may be expected to coöperate with Britain and Poland in maintaining an orderly coal market. Representation of consuming interests is evidently required to ensure that this coöperation does not take the form of a conspiracy against the importing countries.

If Britain and Germany are likely to coöperate in coal, what is the probable over-all pattern of trade relationships between the two? A number of British manufacturers are already expressing worries that German competition in manufactured goods will make it difficult for Britain to reach her export goals on the continent. In some industries, like textiles, the German necessity to export is greater than before the war because of the residue of the almost completely watered-down policy of reducing capacity in warlike heavy industries. In others, like precision instruments and chemicals, British manufacturers have rushed into the vacuum left by the collapse of German industry after V-E Day, but are currently meeting pressure from German efforts to reëstablish their pre-war position.

The problem is a serious one. Britain's export targets call for large-scale exports, both to the continent and overseas. German market connections run rather to the continent than to non-European markets. If trade with Eastern Europe is restricted because of the difficulty of obtaining food and raw materials from that area, Germany will need markets in Europe and abroad to an even greater extent than before. One possibility is that which was in process of exploration at Duesseldorf in February 1939 between the Federation of British

Industries and the German *Reichsgruppenindustrie*, an explicit agreement not to compete. Today this would be more likely to run between governments than between representatives of private business enterprise. The other extreme is "cutthroat competition", which extends to price cutting. The likelihood is imperfect or monopolistic competition, in which prices are maintained without collusion, and competition runs in other terms. As the first indication of this attitude, your attention is invited to a letter in *The Economist* (London) of February 5 last, in which the export manager of the German Volkswagen plant indignantly denies that Germany seeks any special advantage in export markets through price cutting or exchange depreciation, but wants only "a fair share of the market and to compete on performance, value and quality."

There is the further problem of German coöperation in European recovery, which concerns currencies and balances of payments. Until the passage of the Economic Cooperation Act, the occupation authorities in Germany insisted on receiving dollars in payment for their exports to Europe in excess of imports. This currency, they held, was needed for their overseas purchases. This attitude was maintained, despite the fact that some of Germany's customers had run out of dollars and were being supplied with more by the United States, and despite the fact that German requirements from overseas were also being supplied by the United States. Shipments to Denmark were cut off by the military occupation authorities in Germany on one occasion, those to Austria on another, and every country in turn was threatened with such treatment.

Under the European Recovery Program, the matter is temporarily settled through the Intra-European Clearing Arrangement under which German exports to the other countries participating in the European Recovery Program in excess of imports are in effect financed by conditional grants to the Bizone. But what happens after June 30, 1952?

The answer in part depends on the success of other countries in liquidating their deficits in trade. If all the countries of Europe balance their international accounts, surpluses earned by Germany in European trade (of which the counterpart is other European deficits) will be balanced by other European surpluses outside Europe. These can be paid to Germany to enable her to discharge her non-European deficits. In other

words, Germany will have no convertibility problem if other European currencies become convertible into dollars or (in part) sterling. But will they? And can Germany count on their so becoming? And what can Germany do if it cannot count on it? These are difficult questions.

The Interim Report of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation on the four-year program expressed grave doubt that the original four-year programs of all the countries would be fulfilled. If other countries fail to produce the free goods for export and sell in overseas markets enough more than they buy from these areas, to pay for the surplus formerly bought from Germany, the latter is going to have to do without, or export in overseas markets its surplus which formerly went to European countries. This would bring it into competition on a grand scale with United States exporters. Another alternative may be to join the Eastern bloc and exchange its industrial products against foodstuffs and raw materials in this area. While this would pose serious political consequences for the United States and for Western Europe, it would require a better record of production than Eastern Europe has thus far been able to swallow, plus some major political adjustments in Poland and Czechoslovakia.

The Germans may not worry about this longer-run problem on the score that the prospect of the latter alternative continuously dangled before American eyes is going to keep the United States continuously underwriting German overseas deficits. This attitude has already been suggested by the attitude of the authorities in Germany. The question may be asked, which country has which over a barrel?

I am afraid that I have no solution to offer in this field, any more than in any other. It is clear that Germany will have to make its projected drive for non-European exports, difficult though it will be to unscramble certain eggs, such as the trademarks now extinguished all over the world, or the dismantling of the I. G. Farben export organization. Exports to South America in 1952-53 in the amount of \$354 millions at 1948 prices are going to call for a certain amount of self-restraint on the part of American exporters who will meet fierce competition. Some crying has already been heard from this quarter long before anyone has really been hurt. It is likely, moreover, that if any aid to Europe has to be continued after June 30,

1952, to assist the efforts of the International Monetary Fund, the need will be greater for indirect aid than for direct aid, on the assumption that the countries with projected surpluses in Europe will recover ahead of the countries with projected deficits. Germany (and other countries like Belgium and Sweden) would then be assisted only through ensuring that their European surpluses are rendered convertible.

In retrospect, it appears that E.R.P. and the British loan were put forward in the wrong order. The attempt should have been made to get recovery first and convertibility second. It is not, I hope, too late to plan for convertibility, possibly with the use of the stabilization loans contemplated originally by the C.E.E.C., where the resources of the International Monetary Fund will not be sufficient and where no reserves of gold and dollars exist. German recovery, as well as that of Belgium, Britain, Italy, and so on, should not be deferred for lack of the achievement of convertibility by currencies of other countries in 1952. But it is still important to cut off Marshall Plan aid after June 30, 1952.

My time runs out. I have devoted all too much of it to the technical problems of German recovery and too little to what used to be known in the Army as the Big Picture in the Atlantic Community. This is conscious choice. Gains in international coöperation accrue in small increments, not infrequently in agreements by technicians over technical problems. As the acute shortages have disappeared in Europe, some of the technicians have changed and with them the jargon. The talk today no longer centers on esoteric grades of coal, or *laisser-passers* for truckers as much as on "unrequited exports" and "disinflation". With this change, the technical discussion cannot be divorced from political responsibility. As the shortages recede and ends proliferate, choice is required among ends as well as among means.

In talking of economic recovery, however, we must be careful not to neglect the broader framework altogether. In some respects it can vitalize and give meaning to the technical work I have been talking about. I have in mind that recovery must be thought of not solely as a weapon of defense of the Atlantic Community against the aggressive power of the Soviet Union and international communism, but also as an offensive measure designed to attract Eastern Europe, not excluding the Soviet

Union. Diplomacy should not remain, as it too often has been in my experience, the art of counterpunching.

If this proposition be accepted, two consequences follow. First, it becomes imperative for us to decide (but not necessarily to announce to the world) whether we will accept victory on negotiated terms, or whether we insist on unconditional surrender. Second, we must be careful that measures appropriate to defensive operation in Western Europe are equally suited to the peoples to whom we are trying to appeal within the Soviet orbit. Reflection on both considerations will demonstrate, I suggest, that the shortest road to economic recovery, in Germany and in Western Europe as a whole, may not be the shortest road to the American peace and prosperity which European recovery is designed to foster.

REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN

CHAIRMAN KROUT: Thank you Professor Kindleberger for your very careful analysis of the economic situation in Germany. No economist has ever made me feel quite so humble as I have felt while listening to your statement of the difficulties that confront us.

Our final speaker this afternoon has long been a friend of the Academy of Political Science, and it is very pleasant to welcome him once again to this platform. Many of you have followed his commentaries on military affairs in two New York newspapers—the *Herald-Tribune*, and the *Post Home News*—or others of you have read a provocative series of volumes which he has published in the past few years, *The Ramparts We Watch*, *The Hour of Triumph*, *The Strength We Need* and, most recently, *If Russia Strikes*.

It is a very great pleasure to introduce to this audience Major George Fielding Eliot.

MAJOR GEORGE FIELDING ELIOT: Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, Professor Kindleberger said he had been feeding you some pretty strong and technical stuff. Well, my subject is "Organizing the Atlantic Community: The Strategic Problem", and if you think you have had technical stuff from Professor Kindleberger, wait until you hear what you are going to get now.

ORGANIZING THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY: THE STRATEGIC PROBLEM

GEORGE FIELDING ELIOT

New York Post Home News

STRATEGY is the handmaiden of policy. Clausewitz observes that every war has a political objective. It follows that every strategic plan must be based at least on a political assumption, if not on a political directive. In these days when war absorbs the whole resources and efforts of nations, policy and strategy are so closely interdependent that it is difficult to say where the one leaves off and the other begins.

It may well be urged that the basic intent of the North Atlantic Pact is not to wage but to prevent war, by confronting any prospective aggressor with overwhelming and unified power. But no such possible aggressor will respect mere words engrossed on parchment. The declared intention of the parties to the Pact to maintain the security of the North Atlantic area will, if it is to be effective, require the support of military forces and military arrangements for coöperation which will command respect because of their obvious efficiency. The policy of coöperation for the common security demands a common strategy reinforced by adequate arrangements for the combined use of the military forces of the parties to the Pact.

By entering into the Pact, each of the parties subscribes to the view that the security of all of them would be seriously endangered by a successful armed attack against any one of them. In particular, the United States gives formal recognition to the strategic fact that its own security is bound up with the security of Western Europe—that the extension to the shores of the Atlantic of the military power of any aggressive continental nation would be an intolerable threat to the safety of the United States. This has always been so, but now we write it down and sign our names to it.

The military conditions which brought the Pact into being are two—the vast power of the Soviet armies in Europe, and

the corresponding weakness, amounting almost to a military vacuum, to be found in the free countries of Western Europe. When to this military situation are added the aggressive character of Soviet policy and consistent Soviet refusal to coöperate in the organs of world security set up under the United Nations Charter, it is surely not unreasonable to find the countries menaced by this state of affairs drawing together for their common defense, in the hope that by so doing they will oppose a barrier to further Soviet aggression.

This is sound policy. But strategy seeking to implement this policy comes at once upon the embarrassing difficulty that the military power which must support policy is weakest precisely at the point of greatest danger—the eastern land frontier of the countries of Western Europe, facing the Soviet armies. The United States, by far the strongest military state of the North Atlantic group, is also the farthest from the area of danger. The primary strategic consideration facing the parties to the Pact is therefore to bring American strength to the support of European weakness, both by the immediate movement of weapons from American arsenals into the hands of European armed forces, and by suitable arrangements for timely American aid to our European allies in case of an armed attack upon any of them. As General Omar Bradley, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, said in a speech in this city last Tuesday, the problem is “to funnel the great strength of the New World to the ramparts of the Old, and thus challenge an enemy where he would transgress.”

This calls, in the initial stages, not so much for a redistribution of armed forces as for a redistribution of weapons and equipment. At present, the military needs of the North Atlantic states may be stated as follows:

(1) Sufficient ground forces, supported by tactical aviation, to hold off any Russian attack on Western Europe until help can arrive from across the Atlantic. These ground forces, obviously, cannot be American or British, save for the comparatively small armies of occupation in Germany. They must be on the spot, ready at a moment's notice, with their equipment and their reserves. They must therefore be drawn principally from the populations of the countries to be defended—France, Italy, the Benelux Powers, Norway and Denmark. The shattering effect of the war upon European industrial produc-

tion has deprived these nations for the time being of the ability to produce weapons in sufficient quantities to arm their defense forces. Such weapons must, therefore, be provided from the only available source, the United States.

(2) Tactical air power sufficient to protect the island of Great Britain from attack by air forces and guided missiles if enemy formations should advance far enough to make such an attack possible, plus a rising margin of tactical air power based on that island sufficient to gain and maintain air superiority over Western Europe against increasing Soviet air forces. The Royal Air Force is probably capable of discharging the defensive mission, but will need help from the United States to take care of the second job.

(3) Strategic air power capable of retaliating with powerful and effective blows against the centers of enemy industrial power and against his lines of supply at vulnerable points. The core of this striking force would be formed by the Strategic Air Command of the United States Air Force, supported by the Royal Air Force and by naval aviation as opportunity might appear. Having in mind the present radius of action of military aircraft, the effectiveness of this counterattack (and therefore its deterrent effect on the Soviet mind) will depend in large part upon the availability of suitable overseas bases. The security of such bases from attack by Soviet ground and air forces is therefore of primary importance.

(4) Complete command of the sea and air lanes between the continent of North America and Western Europe, including Great Britain, in order that American power might flow rapidly across the Atlantic in case of need.

It should be clear that these four factors are interdependent, that each depends for effectiveness upon all the others. The weak spot in this strategic structure is, as already observed, the present inability of Western Europe to hold off, even temporarily, a full-scale attack by the overwhelming numbers of troops and aircraft at the command of the Soviet Union. Once this weakness has been corrected, the deterrent effect of the whole fabric of military power which I have described will have been vastly increased. The danger that the Soviet government will resort to war as an instrument of its policy will diminish proportionately as the temptation now offered by European military weakness diminishes.

The threat of American air power firmly established in British and European bases is indeed of a very different order as a deterrent than the threat of such air power operating from North America or from a Britain writhing under a hail of bombs and guided missiles launched from the shores of the adjacent continent.

It is necessary to speak thus bluntly in order to make clear the nature of the strategic considerations imposed on the military planners of the North Atlantic states by the political directive of the Pact itself.

Above all else, it is essential that there should be a plan for the common defense, and not only a plan but a military agency able constantly to review and revise that plan in the light of changing conditions, and to function as the nucleus of an Allied combined staff in case of emergency.

Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty recognizes this need, in providing for a Council on which each of the parties shall be represented, to deal with matters of common policy, and for a defense committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of the articles relating to common military preparation and action.

No military problems are more difficult and complicated than those of the direction of the military efforts of a coalition of independent states.

It is said of the Duke of Marlborough that he spent more time in persuading allies than he did in the actual conduct of military operations. During our own Revolutionary War, French help proved of little value until the French government, at the persistent urging of Benjamin Franklin, finally gave orders that Rochambeau's forces should operate under Washington's command. The victorious campaign of Yorktown was the immediate sequel.

During the years of increasing tension preceding World War I, though the need for Anglo-French coöperation against German aggression was becoming daily more clear to everyone, the French general staff refused to intrust its plans to the British, so that in sending the British Expeditionary Force to France the British government was, as Sir Frederick Maurice bitterly remarked, "staking their national existence on a plan in the preparation of which they had had no voice." Fortunately, the lessons of that war and of World War II, learned at bitter

cost, have taught most of the nations of the North Atlantic Pact a good deal about the problems and the requirements of allied military planning and of combined commands. We have learned a great deal.

General Requin, formerly director of the French National War College, considers the problem a triple one. There is needed, he says:

Political direction, which devolves upon the governments in a form to be determined by them, but which must in the last analysis coordinate and bring into play all the military, economic and diplomatic means at its disposal, in order to achieve the aims of the coalition;

Strategic direction, assuring the coordination of the armed forces of the coalition on all fronts, achieving a framework of common effort;

Unity of command of the armed forces of the coalition, operating in close liaison or as a combination in each theater of operations.

We may assume that the Council to be created under Article 9 of the North Atlantic Pact will, with its subsidiary bodies, proceed to examine the problems of political direction and economic coöperation.

The problems of strategic direction (with which we are here immediately concerned) will be taken up by the defense committee, which will undoubtedly create a military staff representing the chiefs of staff of the several countries.

The question of unity of command in the possible theaters of operations may be approached by the appointment of commanders in chief designate, as has already been done by the Western Union Powers. These commanders in chief might well form the nucleus, in the preparatory stages, of the combined military staff of the North Atlantic Powers. If an overall commander in chief for the allied forces is thought necessary, it is fortunate indeed that there is available an officer whose experience and success in the command of allied forces of all arms is unequalled in all the pages of military history. I refer, of course, to General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Whatever may be the precise machinery set up for the purpose, one thing is clear. The military plans of the North Atlantic Union must be prepared in advance, they must be ready

when an emergency approaches. There will be no time for improvisation afterward. In two major wars, the latent force of the United States has been the last reserve of freedom. There was time to consider how it could be best employed, and to prepare it and throw it into action at the decisive time and place. This time, if war comes, we shall be in the front line, engaged with all our power from the very outset of hostilities; and if we are to prevent war, it will only be because of the knowledge in the minds of contemplative aggressors that we are ready for exactly this kind of action. But we cannot make effective use of our power alone. We can use it best and quickest only by coöperating with others, who hold the positions from which we must operate. That is why we cannot put off until the fifty-ninth minute of the eleventh hour the necessary planning and arrangements for the combined use of our forces and positions with those who have associated themselves with us to face a common peril.

Nor will it be enough to evolve a single over-all plan and file it away, to be taken out of pigeonhole "B" when we are awakened in the night by the news of approaching danger, as legend tells us of Von Moltke. Any military plan worth the paper it is written on must be the subject of constant revision, as conditions change. Such plans must be flexible, must allow for the unforeseen, must above all be prepared and revised by staffs imbued with what General Requin calls the true spirit of coalition. This spirit, Requin tells us, "has its origin and its reason for existence in a solidarity which admits of no hierarchy among the nations of the coalition, and sets the common end to be attained above all special interests. Its attainment is difficult, but this is the price of victory."

We might here take note of the existing military agencies common to two or more of the Powers of the North Atlantic Pact, agencies which will have to be merged or coördinated in order to provide for the common security of all the countries of the coalition.

The most important of these agencies is perhaps the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff, which functioned so effectively during the last war and which still exists, though on a skeleton basis. Then there are the defense agencies of the Western Union (Britain, France and the three Benelux countries) which include a Committee of Defense Ministers,

a Chiefs of Staff Committee, and a Commanders in Chief Committee under the chairmanship of Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, which has set up headquarters at Fontainebleau, in France, with the name of Uniforce. There are the rather vague but effective defense arrangements between the United Kingdom and Canada, and there is the American-Canadian Joint Defense Committee.

It is for the governments concerned, and their military advisers, to determine in consultation whether any or all of these organizations should be abolished, and merged in a common agency, or whether it would be better to continue them in existence and provide for some means by which their work could be coördinated. Certainly there will have to be some central military planning group, with subordinate bodies dealing with operational plans, intelligence, organization and supply.

Certainly, to return to the relationship between policy and strategy, all this planning will have to be carried out in the closest of contact with the civilian authorities of the various governments, each of which is responsible to its own people for the national security.

The complexities and difficulties of the task which lies ahead can hardly be overstated. It is one thing to plan the conduct of war when the whole resources of a nation or a group of nations are available for its prosecution. It is quite another to plan the distribution and allocation of the comparatively small resources which the legislatures of democratic states can and will apportion for military purposes in time of peace. Each country represented will of necessity be primarily concerned with its own security. The weaker and the more exposed it feels itself, the greater will be its demands on the stronger nations for allocations of weapons, supplies and support. The spirit of coalition will be subjected to severe strains in this process. Yet somehow it must be attained, on both the military and the civilian levels, if the North Atlantic Pact is to have the desired effect of achieving security through united strength.

The stronger Powers must try to understand the needs and the fears of the weaker ones. The will to resist aggression, as General Bradley pointed out in the speech already referred to, may be developed partly by the possession of means to resist

and partly by the assurance of timely aid. Otherwise, especially among peoples still suffering from the horrors of defeat and invasion, it may give way to despair—and despair would be worth 100 divisions to an aggressor on the march.

The weaker peoples, on the other hand, must try to understand the difficulties of the stronger—difficulties arising from tradition, from reluctance to make too definite commitments in advance, from limitations of available resources and from political complications. Many of their anxieties may indeed be resolved in the course of the military discussions which must follow ratification of the Pact.

As time passes, it will, we may feel certain, become more and more clear to the European peoples that the United States is in fact (whatever vagueness they may perceive in the language of the Pact itself) committed to come to their aid if they are attacked.

As time passes, too, the rearmament of their forces will give them added confidence in their ability to stand off the first onset of any aggressor—to hold their own until American help can reach them.

As time passes, the American people—all unaccustomed as they are to membership in a military alliance—will come to realize that they are in fact doing no more now than they were ready to do more than a century ago when the Monroe Doctrine was created. What has changed is not the necessity for security against aggression, but the time and space factors which affect the nature of the necessary arrangements in order that security may be a fact and not an illusion.

It is, after all, in the hearts and minds of the free peoples of the North Atlantic Community that the true spirit of coalition, if it is to be a living force, must take root and flourish.

REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN

CHAIRMAN KROUT: Certainly you will want me to express your appreciation to Major Eliot and to each member of the panel this afternoon for their admirable contributions to this meeting.

PART III

THE NORTH ATLANTIC PACT

INTRODUCTION *

CARLTON J. H. HAYES, *Presiding*

Seth Low Professor of History, Columbia University
Former United States Ambassador to Spain

* Opening remarks at the Dinner Session of the Semi-Annual Meeting.

THIS year's Spring Meeting of the Academy of Political Science has happily coincided with a most significant event in international relationship; and at our concluding session tonight we shall have the privilege of hearing that event discussed from different angles by three statesmen who have had an important part in it.

The event, of course, is the signing of the North Atlantic Pact by plenipotentiaries of twelve nations on either side of the ocean. The Pact is regional, but it does not create any novel Atlantic Community. An Atlantic Community has existed in fact, if not in name, for several centuries. Since early modern times, Englishmen and Frenchmen and Spaniards and Portuguese and Italians and Netherlanders and Scandinavians have been making the Atlantic Ocean an inland sea of Western Civilization. Here in America, our languages, our religions, our culture, are rooted in Europe; our ideals of liberty and constitutional government are a heritage of Europe. America has long been a frontier of Western Europe; and Western Europe a bastion of America. Latterly, steamship and airplane have only shrunk the distance of our inland sea, and quickened the consciousness of community on both sides of it.

The Atlantic Community has unfortunately endured a protracted series of wars; and at least since the seventeenth century almost all the major wars involving the eastern coast of the

Atlantic have also involved the western coast. America, let me remind you, has been a participant with Europe in the War of the Palatinate, the War of the Spanish Succession, the War of the Austrian Succession, the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, and the War of 1914 and the War of 1939. The chant of the United States Marine Corps, "From the Halls of Montezuma to the Shores of Tripoli", expresses a basic geopolitical truth.

No, the new North Atlantic Pact has not created an Atlantic Community. Its great importance is, rather, that at long last it solemnly recognizes such a Community and pledges its members on both sides of the Atlantic to joint counsel and action to prevent the recurrence of war and to secure peace and freedom for ourselves and for the world.

Collective security is obviously the central purpose of the regional North Atlantic Pact. It is also the central purpose, on a world scale, of the Charter of the United Nations to which the United States, with most of its cosignatories to the Pact, is committed and for whose successful functioning we ardently hope.

But does not the coexistence of these two agencies naturally raise, in some minds, certain doubts or perplexities about the effect of the one upon the other? If so, I know of no one more competent to throw light upon the interrelationship of Atlantic Community and United Nations than our colleague in the Academy of Political Science, Professor of International Law at Columbia, and United States Ambassador-at-Large, Dr. Philip C. Jessup. Mr. Ambassador! [Applause]

THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY AND THE UNITED NATIONS

PHILIP C. JESSUP

United States Ambassador-at-Large

THERE is nothing novel in the subject which has been given to me to talk about this evening. As a matter of fact, it would be difficult to find any novel point in connection with the North Atlantic Pact. One of the gratifying aspects of the development of the plans for this Pact is the fact that it was made public even before it was signed and that there is therefore this present period before its ratification during which people can comment on it. They have commented freely on almost every aspect of it. I have tried to study as many of these comments as possible. Some of them have been made in the press, in news stories, and in editorials or columns, some in radio comments, some in the views of organizations, and some in correspondence and conversation with individuals.

I have collected from all these sources the principal and most frequently recurring arguments and doubts which have been expressed concerning the Pact in so far as it bears on the United Nations. I am not now dealing with other aspects of the Pact. I have tried to analyze the points and I shall try to deal with them tonight.

Before looking at these various views in detail, I should like to suggest that some of them reflect positions which were taken when the idea of the conclusion of such a treaty was known but before its text was made public or even agreed upon. The expression of many of these points of view during the period of negotiation was extremely helpful. It influenced the drafting of the text. I shall not try to be specific and name names or refer to particular points, but I have no doubt that there are many organizations and individuals who have taken satisfaction in seeing reflected in the Pact ideas which they had discussed during the negotiating stage.

The relation of the conclusion of the Pact to the United Nations can be examined from several points of view. First,

there is the text of the Treaty itself which can be analyzed in the light of the United Nations Charter; second, there are the authoritative declarations of the President and of the Secretary of State concerning our policy and our intentions; third, there is an area which is necessarily more speculative—it involves an analysis and appreciation of the world situation and of the operations of the United Nations and of the way in which the North Atlantic Pact will be utilized. Speculation, at least in public, is not generally considered to be good diplomatic practice, but I shall venture a short distance into that field.

I think that one can deal briefly with the analysis of the text of the Treaty, since the essential points have already been made abundantly clear in various official statements.

In the first place, the preamble begins with a reaffirmation of faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

In the second place, Article 1 is a restatement of the specific principles stated in Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 2 of the Charter. Using the language of the Charter, the parties agree to settle their international disputes by peaceful means. This statement is not confined to disputes among the parties to the Treaty; it includes disputes between parties to the Treaty and states which are not parties. Even more important, this Article 1 uses the language of Paragraph 4 of Article 2 to pledge the parties again to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force . . . in any . . . manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." Nothing could be more explicit in declaring the defensive and non-hostile purposes of this treaty.

In the third place, Article 5 of the Treaty, which might be described as the operative article, calling for joint action in self-defense in case of an armed attack, expressly cites and is based upon Article 51 of the Charter. It includes that provision in Article 51 which requires states acting in self-defense to report immediately any measures which they may be forced to take to the Security Council. It states also the obligation under this same article to terminate any such measures when the Security Council has acted.

In the fourth place, Article 7 of the Treaty reaffirms the principle contained in Article 103 of the Charter. That article

of the Charter says that, if there is a conflict between the obligations of members under the Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, the Charter obligations shall prevail. This is what Article 7 provides. This provision is reinforced by Article 8, wherein the parties declare that none of their existing international engagements—which include their engagements under the Charter—is in conflict with the provision of this Treaty.

In the fifth place, Article 12 of the Pact, which provides for possible review of the Treaty after ten years, specifically says that any such review shall take into account “the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.” This is a recognition of the desire of the parties to look forward to the day when a universal security system as originally envisaged in the Charter will materialize and provide the sense of security which is essential to the maintenance of international peace.

Now so far as official statements are concerned, there has been not one iota of quibbling or evasion. Let me remind you that in his Inaugural Address, on January 20, the President announced the plans for concluding this North Atlantic Treaty. He therefore had it in the forefront of his mind when he stated the first point of his four-point program, in which the objectives of the United States for the promotion of peace and freedom were outlined. That first point was:

We will continue to give unfaltering support to the United Nations and related agencies, and we will continue to search for ways to strengthen their authority and increase their effectiveness.

When the North Atlantic Pact was signed in Washington on April 4, the President reiterated this policy. He said:

The nations represented here have known the tragedy of those two wars. As a result, many of us took part in the founding of the United Nations. Each member of the United Nations is under a solemn obligation to maintain international peace and security. Each is bound to settle international disputes by peaceful means, to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territory or independence of any country, and to support the United Nations in any action it takes to preserve the peace.

That solemn pledge—that abiding obligation—we reaffirm here today.

We rededicate ourselves to that obligation, and propose this North Atlantic Treaty as one of the means to carry it out.

Through this Treaty we undertake to conduct our international affairs in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. We undertake to exercise our right of collective or individual self-defense against armed attack, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter, and subject to such measures as the Security Council may take to maintain and restore international peace and security.

I think it would outweigh the record to cite to you every other authoritative official pronouncement on this subject. I confine myself therefore to reminding you of what the Secretary of State said on March 18 over the radio, when the text of the Pact had just been released:

The Atlantic Pact is a collective self-defense arrangement designed to fit precisely into the framework of the United Nations and to assure practical measures for maintaining peace and security in harmony with the Charter.

It is the firm intention of the parties to carry out the Pact in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter and in a manner which will advance its purposes and principles.

Now some say that, while this record proves that the President and the Secretary of State intend to strengthen rather than weaken the United Nations by the conclusion of the North Atlantic Pact, it does not prove that the Pact will actually have that effect. That is a natural and proper comment. That is, fortunately, part of our democratic process of popular discussion of great public issues. I think we should therefore analyze the probable results of the Pact in the light of its possible influence upon the United Nations. We should do this, as I have said, even though it leads us into the field of speculation.

The question whether the Pact will weaken the United Nations cannot be separated from the question whether the Pact contributes to the maintenance of peace. Let us plumb this problem by asking the question: "Would any state not a party to the Pact be justified in feeling that the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty constitutes a threat to its peace and

security?" I believe it would not. It is clear from the text of Articles 4, 5 and 6 of the Treaty that its provisions are not to be brought into play unless there is a threat to the territorial integrity or political independence or security of one of the parties or unless there is an armed attack in the areas defined by Article 6. In other words, the Treaty does not come into play unless there is a violation of Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the Charter. These points emphasize the fact which the Secretary of State has made abundantly clear; namely, that the Atlantic Pact is defensive and not offensive.

Now Article 51 of the Charter justifies action in self-defense only in the case of an "armed attack". The whole theory of that article is that force cannot be used as an instrument of national policy on the individual determination by a single state that its interests would be advanced by the use of force.

There is nothing in the Pact to call for or to justify the use of force against any other state which loyally complies with the Charter of the United Nations. It has been made abundantly clear that the Treaty has not been concluded for the purpose of justifying or provoking war but rather for the purpose of making war much less likely. No government of a state not a party to the Treaty can say that this Treaty is directed against it unless that government is prepared to put on the cap which marks it as having aggressive intentions against one or more parties to the Treaty.

For the very reason that the North Atlantic Treaty is subject to and in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, it cannot constitute a threat to any other state whose policies and actions are also in conformity with and subject to that same Charter.

It would be less than frank, however, to avoid stating the fact that the conclusion of this Treaty has resulted from the fears which the policy of the Soviet Union has created. This situation was made crystal clear by Mr. Spaak, the Belgian Prime Minister, at the Paris session of the General Assembly. He was replying to Mr. Vishinsky, the chief Soviet spokesman, who had made it perfectly plain that his country was not going to co-operate in solving any of the agenda problems before the Assembly. Mr. Spaak said:

I must answer you. I think I am the one to do it, because no one could consider that Belgium is trying to be provocative against the Soviet Union. We are afraid because by your conduct you have rendered this organization ineffective. We are afraid because the problems before this Assembly have remained unsolved; because even when a solution is proposed by a majority of the United Nations you have refused to adhere to this solution. We are afraid because we have placed all our hopes and confidence in the defensive organization of the United Nations; and through the policy you have pursued, you are forbidding us to seek our security and our salvation within the framework of this organization, but making us seek it within the framework of a regional arrangement. We are afraid of you because, in every country represented here, you are maintaining a fifth column, beside which the Hitlerite fifth column is nothing but a Boy Scout organization, if I might say so. There is not a single spot in the world, whether in Asia, whether in Europe, or whether in Africa, where a government represented here fails to find difficulties and these difficulties are being still further aggravated by you. . . .

Since Mr. Spaak made this lucid statement in Paris, the recent series of declarations by Communist leaders in a number of countries to the effect that their first loyalty was to the Soviet Union and not to the countries of their ostensible allegiance has done nothing to allay these fears. While that sense of insecurity pervades the world, the United Nations cannot flourish and develop as it should. Here we go round the circle, because the United Nations itself cannot remove the sense of insecurity until it has reached a full stage of development based primarily on the coöperation of all the permanent members of the Security Council.

At this present juncture of world affairs, there are two principal ways in which the sense of insecurity can be removed, given the nature of those fears and the source from which they spring. One way, and the way most to be desired, is a change in the policy of the Soviet government.

I shall comment on only one of the changes in the policy of the Soviet government which would contribute to a world-wide sense of security. I refer to the question which Mr. Spaak mentioned, the question of coöperation in the United Nations to

strengthen the United Nations. It sometimes seems to be assumed that it is the Soviet Union which is coöperating with the United Nations and that it is the United States which, in entering into this North Atlantic Treaty, is refusing to coöperate. As a great governor of this State used to say, "Let's look at the record."

There are thirteen specialized agencies of the United Nations. The Soviet Union belongs to only two of them. Recently it gave notice of withdrawal from the World Health Organization. The United States belongs to all thirteen specialized agencies.

The General Assembly established in 1947 an Interim Committee, frequently called the "Little Assembly". It was alleged that this body was designed to by-pass the Security Council. Its record reveals no such desire or intent. The Interim Committee is engaged in studying the improvement of methods for the pacific settlement of international disputes. Should not all members of the United Nations contribute to that task? The Interim Committee studied the problem of voting in the Security Council on the use of the veto. There may well be differences of opinion concerning the desirability of limiting the use of the veto in particular cases. Surely the way, the United Nations way, to reconcile differences of opinion, so far as possible, is through discussion in the organ of the United Nations which has the matter under consideration. The Soviet Union has never taken its seat in the Interim Committee, but it can do so whenever it is willing to coöperate in this part of the joint endeavor for peace. The United States has actively coöperated in all phases of the work of this Committee.

The Interim Committee also has the function of guiding certain United Nations commissions when the General Assembly is not in session, specifically the Korean and Balkan Commissions. The Soviet Union has not coöperated in the work of those commissions. The United States has coöperated.

These are specific points. Many more could be listed. More could be said about the many other Soviet attitudes and positions which, as Mr. Spaak said, have brought about the conviction that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is not coöperating with and through the United Nations to make the

peace secure. None but the Soviet government can alter the existing impression. The Soviet government can begin tomorrow to build up confidence where it has already built up fear. I do not deny that it will need to overcome great skepticism, but no one has closed, or is attempting to close, the door on an honest attempt.

It is impossible to overlook the fundamental cleavage in the basic theory of the Soviet Union on the one hand and of the United States on the other. The Soviet Union officially stands on the proposition that war is inevitable.

The Soviet Union is officially committed to a philosophy of conflict which is alien to our thinking and to our ideals. Premier Stalin likes to quote the following passage from Lenin:

We live . . . not only in a state but in a system of states, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with the imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. In the end either one or the other will conquer. And until that end comes, a series of the most terrible collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states is inevitable.

We also believe that we live in a system of states, but from this premise we draw the opposite conclusion. Our conclusion is that it is unthinkable that the members of that system of states should not be able to find ways to live in peace with each other.

As the President said in his speech at the signing of the North Atlantic Pact on April 4:

For us, war is not inevitable. We do not believe that there are blind tides of history which sweep men one way or the other. In our own time we have seen brave men overcome obstacles that seemed insurmountable and forces that seemed overwhelming. Men with courage and vision can still determine their own destiny. They can choose slavery or freedom—war or peace.

I have no doubt which they will choose. The Treaty we are signing here today is evidence of the path they will follow.

We believe in the capacity of the human mind and spirit to bridge the deepest chasms, to overcome the most formidable obstacles. The conflict in the world today is the conflict between the Marxist dogma that we must have war and our

Western faith that we can have peace. That faith is an abiding faith, and it will triumph.

Obviously, if the Soviet Union considers that war is inevitable, it prepares for war. So long as it is preparing for war other states must take defensive precautions. Since, however, we in the United States start from the proposition that war is not inevitable, we do not proceed on the theory that a preventive war must be initiated.

Since the world has not yet received convincing evidence of a change in Soviet policy, the way in which the United States can help to eliminate or to lessen the sense of insecurity is by a firm and honest declaration of purpose which the North Atlantic Treaty provides. I would remind you of the passage in the President's Inaugural Address in which he said:

The primary purpose of these agreements is to provide unmistakable proof of the joint determination of the free countries to resist armed attack from any quarter. Each country participating in these arrangements must contribute all it can to the common defense.

If we can make it sufficiently clear, in advance, that any armed attack affecting our national security would be met with overwhelming force, the armed attack might never occur.

One also sees arguments against the North Atlantic Pact which seem to reflect the fear that the conclusion of this Treaty is a definitive and final espousal of the theory that the hope for a universal peace and security system which inspired the drafting of the Charter in 1945 is dead. This is not the case. The necessities of the present require the conclusion of this Treaty, but it is by no means an abandonment of the aspiration for a universal system. This point was made clear by Assistant Secretary Rusk in a radio broadcast on March 20, when he said that we do not regard the North Atlantic Pact "as a fully satisfactory or permanent solution". He went on to say, "We have rejected national or regional isolationism." He pointed to the fact, and it is a fact, that the best assurance we have on this point is to be found "in the intentions of the American people. They want a world-wide security system, and they won't be content with a regional system." The government of the United States has not ceased, and will not cease, to direct its

policy toward the development of a universal system for international peace and security. We have not created the tensions which make this defense Pact necessary at this time. We devoutly hope that it will never be necessary to invoke the provisions of this Pact. But we would not be discharging our responsibilities to the United Nations and to the peoples of the world if at this juncture we did not make this clear declaration concerning the steps we are prepared to take in conformity with the Charter, should the need arise.

Now it is also argued that Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty contains a threat to the Security Council. Article 9 provides for the establishment of a Council composed of representatives of all of the parties. People ask whether we intend to divert into this Council the consideration of international problems which ought to be dealt with in the Security Council of the United Nations.

We have no such intention. This Council, established under Article 9, is "to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty". If it had been in existence during the past years, it would not have been used to settle the Palestine case, or the Indonesian case, or the Kashmir case. Since the Soviet blockade of Berlin was a threat to the peace and affected the area covered by the Treaty, the council to be set up under Article 9 might have given preliminary consideration to that question from the point of view of the potential threat involved. Such consultations would not have affected the jurisdiction or the use of the Security Council. The Security Council remains the body to which we and all the other members of the United Nations have entrusted "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. . . ." That is what is stated in Article 24 of the Charter, and Article 7 of the North Atlantic Pact says specifically that this Treaty does not affect that responsibility.

If the Soviet Union will join in making the Security Council an effective instrument for the discharge of its responsibilities, the Security Council and the United Nations itself will grow in stature and in influence. Meanwhile, its growth can be stimulated by the existence of such agreements as this peace Pact for the North Atlantic Community.

It is worth noting that the criticisms of the North Atlantic Pact as a rival to the United Nations were not addressed to the Rio Pact of 1948. The Rio Pact had a very similar basis in terms of a regional arrangement relying heavily on Article 51 of the Charter. Perhaps when the Rio Pact was concluded, those interested in the United Nations remembered particularly that the conclusion of some such regional arrangement for the Americas was planned at the Chapultepec Conference of 1945, just before the United Nations meeting in San Francisco. The probability of its conclusion was very much in the minds of those who framed the Charter. The Rio Pact therefore seemed to many a reasonable development in no way in conflict with the Charter. I suppose the reason why many people have not taken the same attitude in regard to the Atlantic Pact is that they are influenced more by the political than by basic legal arguments. They might well agree that technically the Atlantic Pact has a sound legal foundation but they are worried that, because of the vital political relationship of the North Atlantic states to the Soviet Union, this new Pact may have serious world-wide political repercussions which did not result from the Rio Pact. Perhaps if the North Atlantic Treaty had been preceded by some other regional defense arrangements, it would have been less subject to this criticism. Perhaps the very importance of this agreement among this particular group of states is what causes concern. It would be a mistake to underestimate the importance of the Rio Treaty, just as it would be a mistake to minimize the importance of the North Atlantic Pact. But it would also be a mistake to assume that this Treaty dealing with the North Atlantic area endangers the United Nations any more than the Rio Treaty endangered that organization.

The extremists among world government advocates run greater risks of endangering the future of the United Nations. In their position is found the antithesis to the approach marked by the Atlantic Pact. Those responsible for the Pact take the first practical step for consolidating peace in a crucial area. By the conclusion of the treaty they enhance a solidarity hitherto embryonic. In so doing they avowedly and in fact support the United Nations. World government extremists, unhappy over the defects of the United Nations, would scrap the progress which it marks and begin anew. They wish to buy a prefabri-

cated home made all in one piece. They do not wish to bother with foundations or practical little details like septic tanks and plumbing and water supply. Happily these persons are not representative of all world government advocates. Many of them advocate building on the existing foundations, that is, on the United Nations. Many of them are willing to take their coats off and to work on putting a roof—or at least a tarpaulin—over our heads. While doing so, they look forward to the day when the palace of all our dreams will shelter us.

Such an attitude is a worthy reflection of our early pioneering spirit. This country was settled by men and women who had their dreams of the future but did not let those dreams interfere with clearing the forest, planting the corn and maintaining their necessary defenses.

We may be at the crossroads of a process by which through such arrangements as these, tied securely into the Charter of the United Nations, a decisive and unaggressive preponderance of power in the hands of states supporting the United Nations can be established. It must be our hope that the circle of states supporting the United Nations will steadily broaden until it becomes universal. [Applause]

REMARKS

CHAIRMAN HAYES: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for your clear and cogent exposition of the relationship between the United Nations and the Atlantic Community.

The next speaker comes from the eastern side of the Atlantic and represents a nation with which America has had long and intimate association, and for which it feels the greatest admiration. The first known discoverer of America was a Norseman.

From the suffering and injustice of the latest World War, Norway now rises renewed and valiant. We are especially happy to welcome here tonight His Excellency, Mr. Morgenstierne, the Norwegian Ambassador to the United States, and to have the opportunity to hear him on the Atlantic Pact.

Your Excellency! [Applause]

HIS EXCELLENCY, WILHELM MUNTHE MORGENSTIERNE: When the Academy asked me to be here tonight and to speak, neither of us realized, I am sure, that this was going to be Atlantic Pact Week, so to say. It has so happened; and we all have heard a great deal about the Pact. We heard the enlightening speeches made last Monday during the signing ceremony by the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, and the Foreign Ministers of the twelve signatory countries. We have just now heard the excellent exposé of Ambassador Jessup. I believe you will sympathize with me when I say that I do not find it a very easy task to address this well-informed group on the matter before us this evening. I shall, however, confine myself mainly to some observations on how Norway, one of the countries of Europe which for five years lived under totalitarian rule, looks at the Pact.

THE ATLANTIC PACT: A NORWEGIAN POINT OF VIEW

HIS EXCELLENCY, WILHELM MUNTHE MORGENSTIERNE

Norwegian Ambassador to the United States

THE basic reason for the attitude of our people toward the Pact is to be found, I believe, in their experiences during those five long years of Nazi occupation. Feeling on their bodies, so to say, totalitarian lawlessness, arbitrariness and *torture*, the Norwegians acquired a new conception of freedom and democracy. They deeply felt and feel today the reality of the words of our war-poet: "Freedom and Life are one."

They made up their mind that it must never happen again. Never again must Norway be caught unaware and unprepared, risking once more the loss of freedom and all that goes with it.

Already during the occupation, on January 1, 1942, Norway signed at the White House in Washington the Declaration of the United Nations, and in 1945, in San Francisco, the Charter of the United Nations. When last Monday we signed in Washington the North Atlantic Pact, we felt strongly that under the present circumstances it was the logical sequence to the line we had been following in recent years.

We still believe implicitly in the idea of a universal United Nations, and we intend to continue to support that organization with all the means at our disposal. And when I say that I mean unfaltering support—not casual, not intermittent, not lip service. The noble words of the Preamble of the Charter, solemnly signed by all the nations represented at San Francisco, keep ringing in our ears, pronouncing that the peoples of the United Nations are determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, to reaffirm faith in fundamental rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and, last but not least, to ensure that *armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest*.

The last few years have made it evident, however, that if the worst should happen, the United Nations would not be in a

position as yet to fulfill all the hopes and expectations inherent in the Charter.

As we know only too well, common action against an aggressor can be nullified by the use of the veto, and it has not been possible so far to effectuate universal reduction of armaments, or international atomic control. Nor has it been possible as yet to organize the United Nations *military forces* envisaged by the Charter, and to which particularly the small nations looked forward confidently for protection.

Under these circumstances, and with the bitter memories of the occupation years always in her mind, Norway temporarily had to look elsewhere for security. We realized, as Senator Vandenberg has expressed it, that security must be found "inside the Charter but outside the veto."

Alone we could not safeguard our freedom. We knew that. And our first thought, naturally, was to turn to our neighbors and friends in the North to see what the three of us *together* could do.

As we saw it, the best solution—not only for ourselves, but for the cause of freedom and democracy generally—would be a Scandinavian regional defense pact, under the Charter of the United Nations, *and in some way affiliated with the Western democracies.*

Our Swedish friends could not see it quite that way. They found that they had to adhere to Sweden's traditional neutrality, sincerely based on her past experiences, and the conviction of the overwhelming majority of the Swedish people. A Scandinavian defense pact based on neutrality and no solidarity with a larger democratic regional defense group offered no solution of Norway's problem.

We strongly felt that "neutrality" today has no relation to the facts of life. I venture to say that even if by compromises we could manage to keep clear of any storms raging around us, it is not evident that, in the long perspective of a nation's life, neutrality would redound to our lasting material and spiritual benefit. It is a fact, which no one who knows post-war Norway will deny, that the essential unity, the moral stamina of the Norwegian people today, is based largely on the realization that we ourselves took an active part in the liberation of our country—and that we did not entirely have our victory and freedom handed to us on a golden platter by our allies and friends. [Applause]

Our experience had taught us that *liberation*, after years of totalitarian occupation, is not enough. It might come to mean the liberation of a *graveyard*. What we wanted was *prevention*—preparation *in advance*, so that possible aggression might be stopped in its tracks.

Let me emphasize this: it is not true that there has been a real division in Scandinavia. Our friendship is as cordial as ever. Apart from our inability to agree on defense problems, our three countries want to continue the closest possible coöperation in all other fields.

In looking for another solution of our defense problems, we did not for a moment forget our old friendship with Russia, a friendship never in all history marred by conflict, but on the contrary cemented by our comradeship-in-arms and by Russian liberation of northern Norway, during the last war. Even this, however, could not change the fundamental fact that economically, culturally and ideologically Norway belongs to the Western World, to the great Atlantic Community.

When we decided to join the North Atlantic Pact, we did it not because we had been under pressure from the United States—the repeated intimations to that effect simply are not true—but entirely for reasons of our own.

Before taking such a momentous step, we naturally asked ourselves some poignant questions: was the text of the proposed Pact wholly in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations? Was it entirely of a peaceful and nonaggressive nature? Did it afford us protection, without imposing on us burdens incompatible with the rebuilding of our country from the ravages of the Nazis?

We studied the text of the Pact and we found reassuring answers to all these questions. I cannot here go into the matter more fully. Dr. Jessup just very clearly explained to us the relations between the Pact and the Charter, so I will confine myself to saying just this: we found, after very searching questioning and consideration, that the replies to our questions were satisfactory.

We found that such a pact was expressly authorized by the Charter and that it stood squarely for its fundamental aims. We found that instead of by-passing or undermining the United Nations—as has been maintained—the Atlantic Pact reinforced it and temporarily took over tasks which the United Nations is not yet ready to carry out.

We came to the conclusion that the Atlantic Pact was definitely an instrument of *peace*, and that if, in spite of everything, war should come, it would have to come from somewhere else. We were certain that all that the Atlantic countries wanted was, through solidarity and collective security, to hold the frontiers of freedom, law and democracy if, God forbid, the free world should once again be challenged by antidemocratic forces. Now these things have been said again and again, and when I repeat them here it is because they are *true* and said with absolute sincerity. If there are some who will not believe our words, we are amazed and sorry. But we shall continue to repeat them, hoping that ultimately we can get the truth across to those with whom we want to live in peace, understanding and friendship. That means *all* nations on this globe.

By the overwhelming majority of 130 to 13 the Norwegian Storting authorized my government to sign the Pact. In so doing it felt convinced that, instead of *provoking* war, it would act as the strongest possible deterrent to war.

I believe that it might be just as well not to suggest that the Pact is directed against any particular country. The Pact is directed only against aggression as such, from wherever it may come. Those of us who have experienced two world wars and the insecure period between them know that conditions change rapidly, and that in foreign policy one has to plan not only for today and tomorrow, but for an uncertain future and unforeseen contingencies.

We all know that the motives of the United States have been impugned in connection with the Atlantic Pact. Realizing the predominant part which the United States is bound to play in this undertaking, we thought it in Norway to be our duty to scan as objectively as we could the general attitude of the United States in foreign affairs in recent years. We came to the definite conclusion that the record showed that America had been anything but eager to enter either the First or the Second World War. Only after the most severe provocation did she enter in 1917, and only after direct attack in 1941. America had not asked for any reparations or territorial aggrandizement after those wars. Immediately upon the termination of the Second World War America had started demobilization and reduction of armaments on a scale strangely irreconcilable with imperialistic and aggressive designs.

We found that America's nearest neighbors, Canada and Mexico, do not seem to have any fear of her—on the contrary, they enjoy relations of perfect trust and sincere friendship. The same is the case with Cuba and the Philippines. Toward Latin America the United States has followed the policy of the good neighbor.

We found further that the United States has taken the lead in organizing and carrying the preponderant burden of four great international undertakings—undertakings which in scope and vision have hardly been equaled and never surpassed in human history.

I refer to what I will call "The 4 horsemen of America": U.N.R.R.A., standing for *compassion*; *The United Nations*, standing for *peace with freedom*; *The Marshall Plan*, standing for *reconstruction*; *The Atlantic Pact*, standing for *security*. [Prolonged applause]

Some of us from the other side feel inclined, I believe, to address to America Longfellow's poem, which President Roosevelt in a crucial moment of the war quoted to Winston Churchill of England:

Sail on, O UNION, strong and great!
Humanity with all its fears,
With all the hopes of future years,
Is hanging breathless on thy fate!

* * *

As it should be, we are hearing these days a great deal about *peace*; and some people seem to think that they are more peace-loving than others. The fact is, of course, that we all love peace, and that from the bottom of our hearts we abhor war. With all our faith and strength we must strive and pray to prevent such an indescribable calamity. I wonder whether the crux of the matter does not lie in the question: what price peace? It is not enough to say: "Peace, it is wonderful." Peace-making is a serious and complicated matter in our present world, because we must insist not on peace *only*, but on peace with justice and freedom. [Applause]

The San Francisco Charter only stipulates that a member nation shall be peace-loving. A suggestion to the effect that a member must be peace-loving *and* freedom-loving was not adopted. I think that was unfortunate.

Norway and the other countries occupied during the war by the totalitarian aggressor know that freedom, very simply, means freedom of the spoken and written word, freedom of assembly, freedom of worship, respect for the dignity of man. They know that freedom implies a régime of law and equal justice for all. They know that if a scientist is not free to search for *truth*, if a writer or a composer is not free to search for *beauty*, wherever he may find it, then we are interfering with the free flow of creative genius.

Such is freedom. No one can convince us, by tortured dialectics, that freedom means anything else. Any retreat from these hard-won bastions of freedom, justice and democracy is not radicalism, not liberalism, but *reaction*.

We also know that we do not want a government *for* the people, if it is not at the same time a government *of* and *by* the people. The *Encyclopaedia Britannica* says: "Democracy, in political science, that form of government in which the people rules itself, either directly, or through representatives."

We have not any of us reached the perfect democracy. It is essential that we are aware of our failures and shortcomings in this respect. But I would say that all of us who build on the idea of government of and by the people *are on our way*. We are constantly endeavoring to perfect the basis and processes of popular government. We think, even, that the *word* democracy without any trimmings is good enough for us.

Our sincere hope is that on this basis of true democracy and freedom *all* peoples will eventually join to create together a world of brotherhood and abundance beyond anything that we have known so far. In the meantime under the Atlantic Pact we propose to protect the blessings which are ours. [Applause]

REMARKS

CHAIRMAN HAYES: As you see, Your Excellency, we greatly appreciate your remarks. You have spoken with both judiciousness and candor.

The third and ultimate speaker this evening brings us back to the western shores of the Atlantic. He is, or has been, I am happy to say, a professor of history. And, in full knowledge of history, he has

signed the Atlantic Pact in behalf of our own neighbor-nation of Canada.

For 135 years Canada and the United States have lived in constant peace with each other, doing without armaments along our 3,000-mile common frontier, and pursuing a common ideal of democratic liberty. We are good neighbors. What George Canning, that great British statesman, said a century and a half ago about calling "the new world into existence to redress the balance of the old" has been exemplified by Canada no less than by the United States.

I have the honor, Ladies and Gentlemen, to present the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honorable Lester B. Pearson. [Applause]

THE HONORABLE LESTER B. PEARSON: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen: I understand that the third batter on the list in a baseball team is usually supposed to be a clean-up hitter. I know you will agree that, from the eloquent and impressive speeches which have preceded me, there is very little, indeed, to be cleaned up in so far as the Atlantic Pact is concerned. [Laughter]

However, I am going to deal with a special feature of the Pact, one of particular interest to my own country, namely, our feeling about the Pact and what it means to Canada, and, indeed, what it means to Canada in her relations with the rest of the world.

It was with a feeling of very special satisfaction in my country that the people of Canada received the news of the signing of this Pact last Monday. That special satisfaction springs, I think, from our geographical position and from our historical origin. The Pact brings closer together the members of the North Atlantic Community who include our neighbor and our great friend, our fellow-American nation, the United States. It includes also our two mother countries, Great Britain and France.

Probably you may find a clue to this special satisfaction with which we up in Canada received this Pact, in a somewhat flippant reply I made to the Secretary of State at the first meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Atlantic Pact group last Saturday in Washington. Mr. Acheson was going around the table in order to find out what language the various Foreign Ministers would speak at the signing of the Pact on Monday. When he came to me, I said that I would speak in North American English with a French accent. [Laughter]

That, I think, indicates in a way why we have a special interest and a special satisfaction in this great and important development which has taken place.

CANADA AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

THE HONORABLE LESTER B. PEARSON
Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs

IN this company of scholars, and at this moment in history, I am led inevitably to speculate upon the more permanent implications of the North Atlantic Treaty which has just been signed in Washington. My own experience as a teacher of history, to which the Chairman has referred, is not so remote that I can resist this temptation. I know, of course, from that experience, that almost any attempt I make to relate the North Atlantic Treaty to events in the past, or to project it upon the screen of the future, will involve me unwittingly in some kind of historical heresy. Fortunately, however, this is a dinner, and not a discussion meeting, and my heresies, whatever they may be, cannot therefore be denounced; at least, not until I have departed. [Laughter]

I am sure that the members of this organization have, during these days, been doing their own speculating—casting their minds back over the past and forward into the future of the peoples who find themselves in this new and significant alliance. From the point of view of a citizen of Canada, one of the members of this new international community, I should like to make the same kind of experiment tonight for a few minutes.

The important question, of course, is whether the North Atlantic Treaty is only a temporary and limited expedient, or whether it marks a new and far-reaching development in the course of international relations. This is a question of very real substance, because the way it is answered by the member governments will affect the way they act as parts of the new community. I know that in your capital city, Washington, as in mine, Ottawa, there are many buildings hastily constructed to meet some temporary emergency, usually for war purposes. In this context, the meaning of the word temporary has a way of being stretched out, until it is hard to distinguish between what is temporary and what is permanent. People who live or work in these temporary structures often wish that a better effort had

been made to forecast the duration for which the need would exist, and that the building had been better done. We shall, within a few days, now, begin to build the structure for which the North Atlantic Treaty is a ground plan. For this reason, I think we should be wise to take a long look into the future, and consider how permanent a contribution the North Atlantic Treaty may make to the progress of international relations.

There can be no question, at least none in my mind, that the alliance has been formed to meet an emergency, arising out of a threat to the security of its members. We had hoped that this security had already been assured by developments in its international organization since the war. Canada sent its delegation to San Francisco optimistically, encouraged by the example of international coöperation which had won the war. Canadians made their contribution to the physical rebuilding of the post-war world, through U.N.R.R.A., through military aid to liberated countries, and through a generous policy of commercial credits to foreign governments. Canada stood fully committed to take its part in the building of a new world, political and economic, and one based on friendly coöperation between *all* the nations which composed it. We in Canada hoped that our own economic well-being and the national security of our country would be assured through the extension into peacetime of the international coöperation of the war. We have had to admit quite frankly, however, that in present circumstances the organization which we created for this purpose in the United Nations is not equal to this task.

Unhappily the basic requirements for the full success of the United Nations did not carry over from war to peace. The unity of the Great Powers, upon which indeed so much depended, was soon eaten away by the acids of post-war controversy. At the war's end, a dozen or more great and contentious political issues rose from the political confusion of Western Europe and Eastern Asia. Basically, these problems could all be reduced to one great question. How far would the Soviet Union go in exploiting the post-war situation so as to extend its territory and increase its might? This question was no idle speculation. We had seen the boundaries of Russia extended first in 1939 and 1940 at the expense of the Baltic countries: Latvia, Lithuania, Esthonia and Finland. As the war went on,

it became clear that the promise of freedom to Poland would not include these eastern Polish provinces, which were, in fact, eventually surrendered by Poland to the U.S.S.R. After the war's end, parts of Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Hungary were also added. By 1945 the boundaries of the Soviet Union had been pushed further to the west than ever before in Russian history.

Not content with this expansion, the U.S.S.R. then proceeded to surround itself with a group of satellite governments, imposing its will upon neighboring peoples through the local Communist parties supported by Russian troops. The list alone of these captive régimes is evidence of the coercion which created them. Who could believe that the Poles, a people that for centuries, with courage and resolve, had fought against all comers for their freedom, would submit of their own free will to Soviet control? For a hundred years, the insistent demand for freedom of the Hungarians, the Rumanians, the Bulgars, the Czechs and the Slovaks has been one of the strongest forces in European politics. Only when it has been suppressed by ruthless physical superiority has this force lain dormant. Indeed, we already see today in Yugoslavia a sign that the peoples in Eastern Europe find the yoke that has been laid upon them heavy and degrading. The one border territory which has managed to maintain its independence is Finland, but even there the long and menacing hand of Moscow threatens dire punishment if the slightest Soviet interest seems to be in danger, real or imaginary.

Now, this tight control which the U.S.S.R. has established by these oppressive means in Eastern Europe has been given a false façade of international respectability by treaty arrangements. The Soviet leaders have been charging that the Atlantic Pact is an offensive threat aimed at them. But they themselves had no hesitation in initiating and negotiating—if the word negotiation can be used to describe their methods—treaty arrangements in Eastern Europe for their own security, long before the Atlantic Treaty was even considered; and before the United Nations had demonstrated its present weakness as an instrument for the maintenance of peace. We are not sure how many treaties and agreements there are among the Communist states of Eastern Europe, because, in spite of the terms of the Charter, only a few of them have been registered with the United Nations. So far

as we can tell, however, there are over fifty treaties and agreements among the group of Communist states comprising the U.S.S.R., Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Bulgaria. These are variously termed treaties for friendship and mutual assistance; coöperation and mutual assistance; collaboration and mutual aid; economic collaboration and reciprocal delivery of goods, trade and payments. Their total effect, however, is to spread a thick net of political and economic commitment over the areas under the domination of the Soviet Union.

In the presence of the problems created by Soviet expansion, what could we expect of an international organization like the United Nations, which was based on the assumed unanimity of the Great Powers? How could there be any unity about the way in which the United Nations was to fulfill its basic function and protect the security of its members, when this Soviet Communist expansion was the greatest threat to such security?

That is the emergency, and the North Atlantic Pact is one answer to it. I have no doubt that it is a good answer. So far as the people of Canada are concerned, I am confident that it represents a firm resolve to stand with like-minded and peace-loving people for the preservation of our freedom. I am equally confident that this is the case with the people of the other nations who, within the next few weeks, will be called upon to ratify this treaty. The question remains, however, whether the alliance does any more than meet the problem of the moment. Will the historians of the future record it as a mere incident in history, like the Kellogg-Briand Pact? Will they set it down as a successful expedient, like the Quadruple Alliance of the period after Napoleon, that tided its members over a period of danger and then disappeared; or will they find in this alliance a great turning point in history? Will they be able to conclude that the events of this week have put in train a series of consequences as fateful to human history as, for example, those which resulted from the association of American Colonies during the War of Independence?

There is, of course, no categorical answer to these questions. The consequences of the alliance will depend partly on the extent to which emphasizes tendencies already present in the history of the Western World. It will depend also on the way in which the members of the alliance translate into action the words

which are written in the document. It is possible that the North Atlantic Treaty will prove worthy of no more than a footnote in the history of this century. We have it in our hands, however, to make of it the title for a new and thrilling chapter.

I am confident that we can do this because I believe that we are building this alliance on solid foundations. It is a principle of political science that political organizations should not be constructed out of materials with poor cohesive qualities. Where they are so built, they are held together only by buttressing, which sometimes requires greater resources than the structure itself. Among the members of the North Atlantic Alliance, however, the cohesive forces are strong and compelling, and they may be discerned in every aspect of the national life of the members of this group. I do not need to discuss in this company the cultural and political background which gives unity to the Western World. I am convinced, however, of the validity of this concept.

From the roof of the small hotel in which the Canadian Delegation to the last United Nations Assembly stayed in Paris, it was possible to look out over the city. I sometimes watched this lovely and impressive sight, and thought of the debt which all of us in North America owe to that great center of light and liberty. In Canada and the United States alike the roots of our culture reach back into the life of Paris, and the political and social growth of both countries would suffer if the enriching influence of that city were blocked off. Then I thought of how, a half-century ago, Paris was one of a great circle of cities, in many lands, which together made up a great cultural commonwealth. Vienna, Belgrade, Prague, Breslau, Bucharest, Warsaw, Dresden, St. Petersburg and Moscow, together with many other cities of many states, were the common home of artists, scientists and scholars, who gave unity and dignity and depth to Western culture. How narrowly is that circle now drawn! One by one the great cities of Eastern Europe have been forced for political reasons by the dark invader to cut themselves off from the intellectual life of the West. If the statesmen of the world could bring about a lasting peace, perhaps the most fruitful consequence of their success would come from the stream of ideas that might once again play freely.

If there is a single ounce of aggressive content in our North Atlantic Treaty, it is to be found, I think, in the intellectual sphere. We have, in one sense, set bounds to a physical area which we mean to defend. We have also, I hope, defined a cultural area, which we mean to expand and develop. We do not wish to impose our ideas on others. But we can challenge the Communist International with an alternative and far more powerful intellectual force—the international of the free scholars and of free men.

For this purpose we shall need the work of political scientists who will write about our institutions with both knowledge and faith. For a generation now the scholars of the Western World have been dissecting and analyzing our society, until we know it with all the tearful intimacy that we know an onion when it is separated layer by layer before our eyes. [Laughter] But we shall need more than analysis to defend our ideas and institutions in a world where they are under constant attack by the fanatical advocates of an alternative system. We shall require the kind of insight which in a doctor makes it possible for him to discern the living tissue from the dead, to discard the latter, and to sustain and nourish what is living. Of this kind of constructive scholarship I can think of no more distinguished example than the studies in the field of international law made by Dr. Jessup himself, in his days as a working member of this Academy before he strayed off into the jungles of diplomacy (from which I hope he will be brought back alive!). [Laughter] I hope we shall have a great deal more writing of this kind from the whole company of scholars within the nations of the Atlantic Community, giving positive formulation to the ideas and beliefs which underlie our way of life.

The North Atlantic Treaty equally gives us the opportunity of taking the initiative in regard to social and economic questions. Throughout the discussions in Washington, the Canadian government consistently, and sometimes very obstinately, held to the view that the Treaty should encourage coöperation among the member states as a normal peacetime activity, particularly in economic and social fields. The permanent importance of this Treaty will depend in large measure on the extent to which we are successful in using it as a vehicle to deepen and broaden economic and social coöperation among free democratic states,

and to press forward toward economic and social justice among them. By showing that democracy can contribute more to the dignity and well-being of the citizen than communism can ever hope to do, we are making our best ultimate contribution to the defense, the "home defense", against communism. This, however, will not be effective if we rely exclusively upon the building up of armed forces or if we allow ourselves to be frightened into reaction and repression. [Applause] In every country the Communists have two great allies, social and economic injustice on the one hand, and political reaction on the other. If we can destroy these allies and build up a strong, healthy and progressive society on a democratic foundation, we can destroy communism. By achieving this we can take away from the Communists the opportunity of representing themselves as the instruments of revolutionary progress. The hope for man's future lies with the free nations, and we must set about demonstrating this in real and practical terms.

The urgent necessity we are under to get on with the constructive work which lies to our hands has, I think, been very well put in a recent editorial in the London *Economist* of March 12, which I should like to quote:

The western powers are engaged at the moment on an arduous and in many ways perilous task. They are building for the first time in their joint histories a regional structure of security, political unity and economic cooperation. Its pillars are the Atlantic Pact, the Council for Europe and the various agencies of the "Marshall Plan." Almost every move in this effort of construction is new. Every fresh development demands a concentration of energy and purpose which it is difficult for democracies with their lax methods and easy-going traditions to sustain. Meanwhile, the Russians, who choose to see in the Atlantic world's regional effort a menace to the regionalisation of Eastern Europe they carried through at break-neck speed after the war, are now bent on using every device of propaganda and pressure to prevent the completion of the structure. As the western powers toil painfully up and down the scaffolding, the Russians and their satellites stand on the other side of the fence, jumping up and down, whistling, chanting slogans, flinging a few stones and every now and then, advancing to the foot of the ladder to ask whether the weary builders will not come down for a nice cup of tea and a chat. It is all rather disturbing and at times tempting.

But the western builders have only one duty—which is to get the roof on to their building. Until they have accomplished so much, attention to what the Russians are doing is not only useless, it is a dangerous waste of time.

A third element of permanence in the Treaty is to be found in the relationship which it makes possible between the larger and the smaller members of the alliance. For this reason, the Canadian government attaches great importance to Article 9 of this Treaty, under which the North Atlantic Council will be set up. In this Council, all the members of the group will be equally represented. Through it, the democratic process of reaching agreement through negotiation, discussion and compromise will be carried out. In the event of emergency, the Council will also be the instrument for deciding what policies should be recommended to the various members of the group. It is one thing for a group of states to accept, as we do under this Treaty, common responsibilities, each taking its fair share in discharging them—and they all will—and, indeed, in adding or subtracting from them. It is, however, quite a different thing for one, two, or three states to assume that they can make decisions which may have far-reaching consequences for other countries and all peoples, and then to expect these other countries to take part in solving the problems which those decisions have created. There are times, no doubt, when the requirements for consultation and for coöperative decisions must be subordinated to the necessities of a grave emergency. But if there is to be genuine collective action, those occasions must be reduced to a minimum. This, I suggest, can be done by making full and effective use of the North Atlantic Council as an agency for collective consultation and collective decisions. Here is an instrument through which we can demonstrate that free nations can work together for their common good, without any one of them sacrificing unilaterally its control of its own affairs, or even being subjected to any undue pressure from stronger or stronger-minded members of the group.

Finally, I think the North Atlantic Treaty gives promise of making a permanent contribution to human welfare because in taking this step we are setting out squarely on the main road toward world organization. At the end of the war the people of the world demanded, in terms that could not be mistaken by

any government, that, in the future, trial by such hard ordeal should not again be necessary. As they looked back on the causes of the conflict they saw many occasions when the free nations, if they had acted in harmony and in strength, could have dissipated the dangers which beset them before those dangers degenerated into war.

War had taught at least this one lesson, that the nations must act together not only to keep the peace, but to build a peaceful world. As an instrument for such collective action, they were determined that an international organization must be set up. Now, that was the road on which we started when the United Nations was established. Unfortunately, it is now all too evident that we made this start in a gear that was too high. Perhaps that helps to account for our bumpy and jerky progress during these early years of the United Nations; perhaps that is why the motor has shown a tendency to stall. The North Atlantic Alliance is a similar machine. We are starting it in a lower gear, but we are on the same road. I think there is a good chance that in our smaller, lower-g geared machine we may be able not only to start ourselves, but to give the United Nations a starting push, and help it to "get rolling" in the way we originally planned it should "get rolling". In any event, we are not abandoning it, as has been repeatedly emphasized, nor will we in any way impede its progress. I know that my own government will not take part in any activity under the North Atlantic Treaty which contravenes the principles or purposes of the United Nations, or which is provocative or aggressive in character. I feel sure that the other governments which have signed this treaty can give exactly the same pledge. The aims and purposes of the North Atlantic Treaty are precisely the same as those stated in the Charter, and the effect of the proposed alliance can strengthen the United Nations by creating conditions in which it can do its best work.

There is, moreover, nothing in the Treaty that should produce an exclusive or isolationist attitude. The world is too small and its parts too interdependent even for regional isolation. Because we shall have increased the measure of our own security, we shall not cease to be concerned about the welfare of states in other areas. The British Commonwealth of Nations, for instance, will be no less durable if two of its members sign this treaty.

We shall continue to be aware, or we should be, that the various regions of the world are interdependent in security matters. We hope that elsewhere in the world peace may be strengthened by agreements similar to the North Atlantic Treaty, the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, or by associations such as the British Commonwealth of Nations.

The Canadian people still hope that the problems of post-war settlement, which have prevented the United Nations becoming what it was originally intended, may be solved. We hope, moreover, that the United Nations itself will contribute to solving these problems. So far, negotiations either inside or outside the United Nations on the major issues which divide the U.S.S.R. and its satellites from the rest of the world have produced little but failure and frustration. No doors are closed, however, and no one has permanently left the conference table. As far as Canada is concerned, no process or negotiation is too onerous and no conference too tedious, and some of them can be very tedious, indeed, that will lead toward settlement. We for our part are prepared to support every effort in every council, conference, committee, working group, or whatever other agency of negotiation may be suggested, to solve the problems which tragically exist between the Western World and the Soviet Union. More than that, we believe that by these methods the long-term problem of security can best be solved. In the meantime, the North Atlantic Treaty will serve as an instrument which, by strengthening the position of the free democracies, will make it possible for them to use the United Nations with greater confidence and more hope of success.

I have tried to suggest some of the reasons that convince me that the North Atlantic Pact has the breath of life in it. I can sum them up by saying that the Treaty is both a consummation and a new departure. It is a consummation in the sense that it results logically and naturally from the closely related background and the common experience of its members. The Western World has already put together a complicated network of interlocking political, economic and social institutions. We have now the material for a closely knit North Atlantic Community. The North Atlantic Treaty not only protects this accomplishment, but also gives us a framework within which we can fit the pieces together into an ordered whole. It is a new begin-

ning because of its enormous possibilities for good. It will help, I think, to eliminate some of the stupid and dangerous talk of the inevitability of war which is becoming too current in certain quarters at the present time. There is nothing inevitable about war; there is nothing unchangeable about evil. If we of the free world can pursue the firm and constructive policies of resistance to communism that are now in train, refusing to be dazzled by delusions of appeasement or stampeded by the provocative counsels of panicky men, we may emerge from the wastelands of our post-war world into greener fields of human achievement. It is because in our view the North Atlantic Treaty can make an important contribution to this forward move that the people of Canada give it strong and sincere support. [Applause]

REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN

CHAIRMAN HAYES: In conclusion, Ladies and Gentlemen, I wish to express the profound gratitude of the Academy of Political Science to all three speakers: to Mr. Pearson, to the Norwegian Ambassador, and to Ambassador Jessup for their presence here tonight and for the very important and timely contributions they have made to a most illuminating session of the Academy. [Applause]

WILLIAM L. RANSOM

It is with sorrow and a deep sense of loss that the Directors of the Academy of Political Science record the sudden death of William L. Ransom on February 19, 1949. For more than thirty-three years he had been a member of the Academy's governing board, responding generously to heavy demands upon his time and making his counsel available whenever it seemed to be needed. His participation in the work of the Academy was never perfunctory, whether he was serving on the program committee, or presiding at an annual meeting, or leading the discussion of some important public problem. On several occasions—in July 1916 and in January and April 1925—he was an editor of the *PROCEEDINGS*, revealing his interest in social and economic questions.

Born in Chautauqua County, New York, on June 24, 1883, Mr. Ransom graduated from Jamestown (N. Y.) high school at the age of sixteen and received the degree of bachelor of laws from Cornell University in 1905. After practicing law for several years in Jamestown, he moved to New York City, where he became associated with William M. Ivins (1907-1911) and then joined the firm of Whitman, Ransom, Coulson and Goetz. He quickly won recognition within his profession for his services as assistant secretary of the Public Service Commission (1911-1913), as a justice of the City Court (1914-1917) and as chief counsel of the Public Service Commission, First District of the State of New York (1917-1918). His activities in public affairs were widespread. In 1916 he served

as one of the Republican presidential electors from New York State, and a year later he was the Republican and Fusion candidate for district attorney of New York County.

Among Judge Ransom's numerous contributions to the advancement of the legal profession, one of the most notable was his long and distinguished service in the American Bar Association. As a member of its executive committee (1932-1935) and as president (1935-1936), he helped formulate its policies and inspire its membership. His work with the Association's Committee on the United Nations took much of his time during the last five years of his life. In 1945 he attended the San Francisco Conference, where his advice was constantly sought in connection with questions relating to international law and the Permanent Court of International Justice.

Judge Ransom will be greatly missed not only by those who relied on his judgment in the councils of the Academy, but also by hundreds who remember his gracious friendliness, his genial manner and his judicious comments as he presided over Academy meetings or participated in the informal discussions.
